Migration within and from Africa
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Shared policy challenges for Africa and Europe

Aderanti Adepoju

Research overview 2016:5
Foreword

The global migration and refugee crisis of 2015/2016 has made it increasingly clear that the challenges associated with growing cross-border mobility cannot adequately be dealt with at national levels alone. There is a great need for a better understanding of the regional and global context for migration and related policy strategies. With this research overview, Delmi aims to examine migration policy developments in Africa, a continent which has historic ties with and increasing importance for Europe.

What are the main migration patterns within Africa? What are the main drivers of migration? What political initiatives to manage international migration within and from Africa have been developed and what forms of cooperation have been tested among African countries? Which conclusions can we draw from developments in this part of the world, and how could the EU and Sweden assist Africa to find sustainable approaches to cross-border mobility?

These are some of the questions that this study reflects upon. It is written by Prof. Aderanti Adepoju, one of Africa’s leading migration scholars. Prof. Adepoju is the co-ordinator of the Network of Migration Research on Africa and Chief Executive of the Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos, Nigeria. Among his many previous positions, he has been advisor to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The study is written in essay form and is based on academic research as well as Prof. Adepoju’s own extensive experience of working in the field of African migration. With his unique experience and insights, he shows us that Europe – and Sweden – must pay more attention to developments in Africa, and step up their co-operation efforts.
Annika Sundén, member of Delmi and until June 2016, Chief Economist at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida, has been responsible for this study. At the Delmi Secretariat, research officers Monica Svantesson, Bernd Parusel, Eero Carroll and Leonora Uddhammar have contributed to its production. As for all Delmi reports, the author of the study is solely responsible for its content, results, and policy recommendations.

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Joakim Palme, Kristof Tamas,
Delmi Chair Head of Delmi Secretariat
Summary

This study examines migration patterns and migration policy developments in Africa, a continent which has historic ties with and increasing importance for Europe. The central questions asked are: 1) What are the main migration patterns within Africa? 2) What are the main drivers of migration? 3) What should be done to manage African migration?

How do Africans move? Key migration patterns

African migration includes both migration between different African countries and migration to other continents. Africa does not have a single migration configuration but a whole range of types at once. It is a region of diverse migration circuits: between origin, destination and transit countries for labour migrants, for flows of undocumented migrants and refugees, as well as for brain drain and brain circulation of professionals. These migrations take place predominantly within the African continent (‘South-South’ migration). As of 2013, about 31.3 million Africans were living in countries other than their birthplace. More than half of these people, some 18.6 million people all told, are still living in Africa. The median age of migrants in Africa is the lowest of migrant populations worldwide (30 years); Africa hosts the highest proportion of young persons (aged 15-24 years) among all international migrants (30 per cent).

About two thirds (65 per cent) of sub-Saharan African migrants remain in the region. This average conceals striking diversity among the sub-regions: 80 per cent in West Africa, 60 per cent in Southern Africa and 52 per cent in East Africa. In Central Africa, less than a quarter (23 per cent) of migrants resides within the sub-region. North African migrants reside mostly outside that sub-region. Available data indicates that about 3.3 million Africans live in Europe and North America.
Africa’s sub-regions are often dominated by the economies of a single country, and movements of persons have consequently been directed to a limited number of countries. South Africa, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya are major poles of attraction for migrants. Emigration from the continent takes two forms: firstly, emigration of skilled professionals and, secondly, emigration of intermediate-skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled persons. The last of these groups in particular is composed of both regular and irregular migrants, including those assisted by smugglers and traffickers to gain entry into Europe.

The traditional pattern of migration within Africa – male-dominated, long-term and autonomous – is changing and becoming significantly more feminised, as professional women migrate independently within and across national borders. Moreover, brain circulation within the region is slowly supplanting brain drain outwards from it.

**Why do Africans move? Drivers of migration**

Migration in Africa is driven by the often interrelated push factors of poverty, mismanaged economies, unemployment, unstable politics, insecurity and violent conflicts, rapidly growing populations as well as environmental deterioration. What has increased migration in recent times is also access to information, as well as faster and often cheaper modes of travel.

The remarkable economic growth rate recorded by many African countries in the last decade has been adversely affected by falling commodity prices and the weaker global economy; and besides the challenge to make growth more inclusive especially for the teeming young population, it has not helped uplift poor people from poverty. Poor living conditions have rendered real wages well below the requirements for mere survival. In many of these countries, living conditions are even worse now than they were at independence in the 1960s and early 1970s. Unemployment across the continent ranges from 18 to 50 per cent, mostly among youths, who are willing to do any work, anywhere and at any wage. These are the pools of potential, destitute and desperate migrants, whose numbers are set to
double within 25 years. The demographic scene in Africa is one of sustained high fertility and a rapidly growing population and labour force. The youthful population and the momentum for a doubling of population every quarter century or less will ensure sustained population growth for the next half century. Among other things, this will put a heavy pressure on the education system, which is already in decline in some African countries.

Moreover, wars and civil unrest generate both economic migrants and refugees since populations displaced by armed conflicts, violence and human rights violations have been rendered not only homeless but also jobless. Many countries in Africa also suffer from political destabilisation, which risks severely eroding the meagre developmental progress of recent years. Continuous political instability in Africa has been fuelled by a potent cocktail of corruption, poverty, economic crisis, crime, violence, unemployment and perceived or real failures in governance.

Demographic, economic and political situations in the region thus signal the possibility of further increased migration in the years ahead. Indeed, rapidly growing populations, chronic unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, internal disorder, mismanaged economies, drought and desertification mean that many African countries today find it difficult to feed, educate, and protect their teeming populations, and to provide adequate shelter and functional health facilities – the basic needs for a decent livelihood. Thus, African migration is not about to diminish any time soon.

**How to deal with migration challenges: what should be done to manage African migration?**

Given the drivers of migration, it is in many cases impossible to separate regular development aid to African countries from what needs to be done to manage African migration. Unless they deal with the root causes of migration, policymakers will just be treating the migratory effects, which is not a long-term solution. Since migration is and has been a response to the cumulative destabilisation of social, economic and environmental systems, aid must take into account demographic, economic,
ecological, political and socio-cultural dimensions. In a spirit of co-responsibility, rich EU countries need to help poor African countries – especially those that are major origin and transit sources for emigrants – to foster local development, reduce poverty and create domestic employment.

A major development issue will be creating productive employment for the millions of youths who will scramble for work in the formal sector or join the lengthening queues of potential emigrants. Young people constitute a viable resource, but less than half of the African school-age population is enrolled in schools, and several thousands drop out each year in each country. The quality and quantity of educational inputs is in deterioration, with outdated equipment, poorly trained and disillusioned teachers, and shortages of textbooks and supplies. Less than two per cent of each cohort that starts the primary level is able to complete a university programme. In many countries, significantly fewer girls than boys attend school and complete courses of study. Education system restructuring would entail designing curricula to suit the changing needs of labour markets, while also combining formal education with work-based training to upgrade the limited skills of youths and also to encourage entrepreneurship. Restructuring also implies ensuring that training abroad through scholarships offered by EU countries (e.g. under the EU’s Valletta Plan) is tailored to the skills requirements of domestic economies. A massive investment in education programmes in Africa could also enable youth to bring down the fertility rate – a near-absolute precondition for development efforts to succeed.

African policymakers face the urgent task of resolving the unemployment crisis. Policy measures must, for example, focus on attracting and expanding foreign direct investment to create jobs, in order to absorb the pool of unemployed – including potential emigrants – and curtail brain drain and unwanted migration to the EU and other rich countries. Policy measures must also be formulated with the aim of coordinating foreign aid packages with the workings of local employment-generating programmes.

To deal with the root causes of migration, African trade must furthermore be encouraged. Intra-regional trade within Africa remains an abysmally low fraction of total
trade. More trade could stimulate development. Rules that hamper emancipation from underdevelopment and poverty have to be changed. These include unfair trade regimes, agriculture tariff and barriers, and often unethical recruitment of highly skilled professionals from poor countries.

Another major development issue is institution building. To achieve this in Africa requires a firm commitment to supporting capacity-building, both in general and in relation to migration and border management. The weakness of overall governance of migration issues in most African countries is due in part to the multiplicity of national institutions involved and the poor coordination amongst them, which is also reflected in the capacity deficit of officials dealing with the migration and development nexus. National migration management capacities are also hampered by poor systems of data management, and a lack of capacity on the part of national institutions involved in migration management to organise, collect, process and disseminate statistical data on their activities. These shortcomings are aggravated also by institutional capacity challenges linked to insufficiencies in financial, human and technological resources. Aid from richer countries would certainly have an impact here. Also legislative support could make a big difference, as could aid in strengthening law enforcement not least in the area of anti-trafficking of human beings.

In relation to institution and capacity building, regional governance in Africa should also be encouraged and facilitated. In Africa, regional institutions are particularly important as mechanisms for combining resources to meet many of the governance challenges that states face. The on-going processes of regional economic integration in Africa, through regional economic communities, are designed in large part to facilitate labour mobility and economic development. Many such regional communities or community precursors now exist, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and regional dialogues such as the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA) and MIDSA, the Migration Dialogue for South Africa. It is potentially very fruitful to follow these examples, intensifying African countries' efforts to enter into bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements. These
agreements have an important role to play in supporting systematic and effective efforts by regional and international labour movements to address the supply and demand of labour markets, promote labour standards and reduce irregular movements. Especially lessons learnt from ECOWAS in creating borderless sub-regions should be replicated by other sub-regional organisations. ECOWAS countries have thus far abolished the requirements for visas and entry permits within the ECOWAS region. Community citizens in possession of valid travel documents and an international health certificate can enter member states without a visa for a period of up to ninety days. Hence people in community member countries have taken advantage of the existing protocols to move visa-free – mostly from poorer to better-endowed countries within the region.

One of the positive aspects of migration is remittances, with impacts in the home country on development at micro- and macro-levels – such as investments in family businesses. Remittances are a valuable source of foreign exchange; they promote employment and income poverty reduction. In recent years there have been much larger flows of remittances from migrants in host economies to source countries. Not all remittances are routed via official channels, on account of heavy transaction costs and the chance of loss or fraud. The transaction costs of money transfers are often exorbitant, and sending money ‘home’ through informal channels may be risky. African governments are increasingly interested in promoting migrants’ remittances for investment purposes, and are using their embassies to disseminate information on available investment opportunities to their nationals abroad. For example Ghana offers a favourable incentive-based policy environment (regarding taxation and related instruments). "Money from Sweden" is a transparent World Bank-certified government-funded free online service, which provides comparisons of fees and exchange rates for transfers abroad through various alternative agencies. The service, run by the Swedish Consumer Agency, is quoted as the fastest possible deal and is independent of all market players (see http://www.moneyfromsweden.se/en). This initiative follows Germany’s enhanced remittance price comparison between different money transfer institutions through "a restructured and re-launched website" (www.geldtransfair.de). Other EU countries can follow these examples.
When dealing with African migration, it is also important not to forget the securing of migrants’ rights. EU countries could aid by providing technical assistance to African states and other stakeholder organisations on identifying and addressing issues regarding migrant rights. If provided policy and advisory support on displacement and human rights, African countries and regional organisations could develop effective strategies so as to protect vulnerable migrant populations.

To ensure that migration issues are dealt with, a special forum should be initiated. There is today no formal forum in Africa for specifically discussing migration matters. Hence, a regional African Advisory Board on Migration Management for all stakeholders should be established as a continuous process, in order to avoid the misrepresentations, ignorance and xenophobia that currently surround the issue of migration. Discourses on migration, especially from the receiving end, are full of anxiety, misconceptions, myths and prejudices—and also feed on xenophobia. In that context, the positive aspects of migrants as agents of development in source and destination countries need to be more widely recognized. Policy analyses should elaborate on such positive roles played by migrants, so as to increase the likelihood that the rights of migrant workers in the host countries are protected.
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Abbreviations

AIR – African Institute for Remittances
AMU – Arab Maghreb Union
AU – African Union
AUC – African Union Commission
AU.COMMIT – African Union Commission Initiative against Trafficking
CEAO – Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
CEPGL – Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO – Civil Society Organisation
CSSSS – Community of Sahel-Saharan States
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC – East African Community
ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM – European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
Abbreviations

EEA – European Economic Area

EU – European Union

GNP – Gross National Product

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IOM – International Organisation for Migration

JLMP – Joint Labour Migration Programme

MIDSA – Migration Dialogue for South Africa

MIDWA – Migration Dialogue for West Africa

NEPAD – New Partnership for African Development

NOMRA – Network of Migration Research on Africa

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

REC – Regional Economic Community

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SWAC – Sahel and West Africa Club

UK – United Kingdom

UNDESA – United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UDEAC – Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale (Economic Community of Central African States)
UNECA – United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USA – United States of America

WHO – World Health Organisation
PART 1 – Observations and analysis

Introduction

This decade has already witnessed a series of multiple, unprecedented and sometimes concurrent events that came to a head in the recent migration crisis – the arrival in 2015 of a million or more people at the Mediterranean shores of southern Europe, and the deaths of about four thousand people on the journey. The resulting complex and diverse flows have challenged stereotyped perspectives on migrants and refugees, prompting calls for medium- and long-term sustainable solutions beyond immediate, humanitarian, life-saving approaches.

While most migrants arriving in the EU during the "refugee crisis" of 2015 and 2016 came from the Middle East and Asia, Africa will be one of the main challenges for Europe in the coming decades in respect of migration dynamics for a variety of interrelated reasons – poverty, decent job deficits, a youth bulge, and the potential doubling of the African population in the next 25 years, and possibly reaching 4.4 billion by century’s end. These issues are however rarely discussed in the public debate on migration in Europe, even though they may play an important role for development.

In exploring the root causes, patterns and trends of migration within and from Africa, this report focuses on the observed changes in the dominant intra-regional, inter-regional and international migration trends; challenges posed by the shifting migratory routes; and long-term measures, beyond avoiding fatalities and coping with humanitarian disaster. It also addresses the root causes of the recent migratory flows, and viable and sustainable solutions. Some of the questions asked are the following:

- What initiatives, frameworks and mechanisms have been initiated in Africa for increased integration and greater labour mobility at sub-regional and continental levels? Are these working effectively?
• In the context of various initiatives, policy frameworks, and the EU-African Declaration on migration, what are the observed changes in the dominant intra-regional, inter-regional and international migration trends?

• What policy measures are in place to respond to the population-labour market-labour migration dynamics?

• What unique challenges are posed by shifting migratory routes, in the central and eastern Mediterranean Sea as well as in the western Balkans? And, what are the long-term measures needed, beyond avoiding fatalities and coping with humanitarian disaster?

• Based on findings on the root causes of migratory flows, what sustainable solutions can be implemented, including sustainable burden sharing between origin, transit and destination countries?

• What are the sustainable solutions in sight for restoring stability in conflict-ridden countries, especially Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia?

• Can a Trust Fund for Africa promote, enhance and manage regional migration flows through a regional economic community framework?

• How can migrants’ remittance flows’ potential for development in the countries of origin be realised and maximised?

• How best to promote coordinated investment in job creation and skills development in Africa as a viable means of curtailing irregular emigration?

• Beyond the immediate priority of preventing more people from dying at sea, and the existing spirit of partnership, shared responsibility and cooperation, what comprehensive package of concrete commitments and action is required of European Union (EU) member states to forestall and contain the unpredictable influx of mixed migratory flows?

In attempting to answer such questions, Part 1 of this report addresses emerging migratory trends, challenges and sustainable solutions in the medium- and long-term perspectives, firstly for Africa, but also for the EU and the transit territories. Part 2 focuses on practical needs and policy recommendations emanating from the analysis in Part 1.
Overview of migration within and from Africa

Africa recorded significant gross domestic product growth of 4.5 percent in 2015 in spite of weaker global economy, and is expected to move closer to the impressive growth of about 6 percent achieved in the pre-global economic crisis of 2008/2009 (AfDB, 2015b). Concurrently, the continent also recorded gains in human development, although the improvements conceal significant inequality between and within countries. The strong recovery from the ‘lost decades’ of the 80s and 90s is however highly vulnerable to economic, political and environmental risks, and creating productive jobs for both the current and projected workforce remains a key challenge for planners. So is the challenge to make growth more inclusive especially for the teeming young population.

Africa is a continent of contradictions: though it is rich in resources, the sheer numbers of Africans living in poverty have grown, a fact reflected in the rapid increase in Africa’s population (World Bank, 2015a). Recurrent internal instability and conflicts have spurred disruptive population displacements. Wars and civil unrest generate so-called economic migrants and refugees, while political destabilisation severely erodes the meagre developmental progress of recent years.

Most African countries do not have a single migration configuration but a whole range of types at once. Africa is a region of diverse migration circuits: as origin, destination and transit for labour migrants, for flows of undocumented migrants and refugees, as well as for brain drain and brain circulation of professionals. These migrations take place predominantly within the African continent, that is, movement is essentially intra-regional (‘South-South’) (Bakewell, 2009; Lassailly-Jacob et al, 2006).

The migration configuration in Africa is dynamic and extremely complex. Over recent years the traditional pattern of migration has been feminising, migration destinations are diversifying, and migration of entrepreneurs is replacing straightforward labour migration within the region. In addition, brain circulation within the region is slowly supplanting brain drain outwards from it. Trafficking in human beings is a dark side of the migration configuration (Adepoju, 2007b).
In Africa, it is the perception of a dismal domestic economic future rather than poverty per se that triggers an outflow of emigrants, males and females (Adepoju, 2006). Increasingly, women – single and married – are migrating independently, in search of secure jobs, both within and outside the region, as a survival strategy to augment dwindling family incomes; they are at the same time redefining traditional gender roles within families and societies.

In most parts of Africa, transnational communities rarely sever ties with home countries, and this is manifested in these communities’ investment portfolios. Some diasporas are active in political advocacy, charity and cultural exchange. A major challenge facing the region is how to retain, effectively utilise, and attract back the rare skills of its nationals – now required for development within the home countries (Adepoju, 2014a). Political leaders are courting nationals to return home; the modality for doing so – for both skilled and unskilled emigrants – has taken center stage in the current debate around repatriation and reinsertion into countries of origin.

Remittances from emigrants abroad have been increasing steeply, and (at about 30 billion USD for Africa and 33 billion USD for sub-Saharan Africa) now parallel export earnings and official ODA (Ratha et al., 2015). They provide lifelines to poor family members, who use them to pay for basic services, educate children, set up small enterprises, or enhance agricultural production. Many political leaders are promoting migrants’ remittances for investment, using their embassies to disseminate information on investment opportunities and favourable policy environments to their nationals abroad. The current discourse in the region is mainly about how to make remittances work productively for poor recipients, communities and countries (Adepoju, 2014a). It should be noted, however, that although remittances may help offset in part the loss of skilled emigrants, they do not compensate for the potential contribution such citizens could make through training and the transfer of expertise to younger cohorts at home.

The problems posed by migration, circulation, permanent residence, and settlement – and the policy responses to them – are quite different, and often seem to be intractable. Many African countries are acting half-heartedly – though a few countries are acting decisively – to foster regional integration (Oucho, 2013). The free movement of persons has nevertheless already been institutionalised within this region, most notably by the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). Other regional economic communities such as the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are grappling with the modalities for establishing similar protocols. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the proposed African Economic Community advocate the creation of programmes to foster labour mobility within and between states, and the sustained development of the entire continent (AUC, 2004; Oucho, 1998). This type of integration is likely to accelerate, paving the way for closer economic cooperation and much-needed labour migration in Africa.

Emigration from and within Africa

Emigration from the continent takes two forms: firstly, emigration of skilled professionals and, secondly, emigration of intermediate-skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled persons (Adepoju, 2007b). The last of these groups in particular is composed of both regular and irregular migrants, including those assisted by smugglers and traffickers to gain entry into Europe.

Available data indicates that about 3.3 million Africans live in Europe and North America (including more than 100,000 professionals), that about 23,000 African university graduates and 50,000 executives leave the continent annually, and that about 40,000 PhD-holders originally from the continent live elsewhere (Adepoju, 2010). It is estimated that foreigners (mainly people of African origin) represent 12 per cent of the highly qualified component of the labour force in the USA, and that they also constitute about 11 per cent of the highly educated workers in Europe in 2010/2011 (OECD-UNDESA, 2013). About one third of researchers and engineers from poor African countries work in OECD countries – a significant number indeed, constituting a huge human capital outflow of expertise produced at great cost by poor countries. Africans with professional, technical and managerial skills have heavily used the USA Diversity Visa Programme – designed to liberalise immigration laws by creating new avenues for entry and immigration to the USA – to enter that country.

Within the continent, the story is the same: a large portion of the migrants from Uganda, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria to Southern Africa, especially to Namibia, Botswana and the Republic of South Africa, consists of professors, engineers, ac-
countants, pharmacists and kindred professionals that help staff the universities and other tertiary institutions of the destination countries (Oucho, 2015; Adepoju, 2010). These skilled workers have usually chosen to move because of political and economic crises in their home countries, as well as inadequate wages and a poor working environment – often creating a professional vacuum at home. Then there are the non-skilled workers. Emigrant nationals of Mali, Senegal and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are mostly artisans and vendors that have invigorated the informal sectors in destination country economies – selling artefacts, recruiting locals as sales assistants and apprentices, and expanding consumer choices of African fabrics (Smith, 2014; Adepoju, 2003). In addition, there is the large number of students from other African countries in the universities of Ghana and South Africa. In the last few years, too, many Nigerian entrepreneurs have moved to Ghana, taking advantage of Ghana’s more conducive environment to establish ventures in communication, banking and manufacturing (Adepoju, 2015b).

As political and economic crises continue to have adverse effects on conditions in the traditional countries of immigration within the region, highly skilled professionals, pressured to leave their countries by uncertain economic conditions, have found South Africa, Botswana, and recently Mozambique to be attractive alternatives to Europe, North America and the (Persian) Gulf States. Most immigrants in Botswana are highly skilled professionals in industry, in tertiary education, and in the private sector (Crush & Williams, 2010). In South Africa, the wide spectrum of immigrants includes traders and street hawkers, workers in the informal sector, workers in commerce, as well as skilled professionals and technicians. The skills dispersion reflected here also reflects the size and diversity of the economic sectors within both origin and destination countries.

For many years now, African leaders have faced the challenge of how to recover the rare skills of departed nationals, and of how to attract them back and effectively utilise them for national development. Given favourable working conditions, skilled professionals, both men and women, would prefer to remain in their home countries. Those in diasporas would often opt to return if given better chances for this, also so as to contribute to local development (Adepoju, 2014a).
Inter-regional and international migration

The tendency is for policy and research to focus on migration from Africa to Europe, but most African migration in fact occurs within Africa itself, especially within the framework of the eight regional economic communities (RECs). Table 1 details these RECs and their membership.

Table 1. Membership of Regional Economic Communities in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Economic Community</th>
<th>Member countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMU (5)</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA (20)</td>
<td>Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, DRC, South Sudan, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC (6)</td>
<td>Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (15)</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD (8)</td>
<td>Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC (15)</td>
<td>Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Africa, sub-regional economic organisations are often dominated by the economies of a single country, and movements of persons have been directed to a limited number of countries within these unions: South Africa and Botswana in the SADC, Gabon in the UDEAC, Kenya in the EAC, Côte d'Ivoire in the CEAO, Nigeria in the ECOWAS, Libya in the AMU, and the DRC in the CEPGL. To cite one example: 28 per cent of the population of Côte d'Ivoire is foreign-born, and one quarter of the workers in Gabon are foreigners from a host of countries inside and outside of Africa (IOM, 2009; World Bank, 2015b).

Events in Libya revealed the extent of South-South migration, as several thousand migrant workers from China, Pakistan, the Philippines and Nigeria and from the neighbouring countries of Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Chad and Egypt were evacuated by the International Organization for Migration due to the ravaging civil war (IOM, 2012).

It should be borne in mind, however, that the distinction between internal and international migration in the region is fluid. Often, internal migration leads to, or is linked to, international migration, which can occur along varying dimensions – asylum seeking, irregular migration or semi-skilled labour migration.

There has also been a recent wave of migration into Africa from other countries, not least from China, Brazil and Portugal. But the estimated one million Chinese migrants in Africa – involved, for example, in building construction in Zambia, in engineering works in Mali and Chad, in farming in Mozambique, and in entrepreneurship in Namibia – dwarf all the other groups of non-African immigrants (French, 2014; Politzer, 2008). China has invested hugely in Africa in the last fifteen years, building roads, bridges, stadia, and so on. In defence of its aid to Africa, and in its capacity as the continent’s largest trading partner overall, China claimed that, as of 2015, it had completed 1,046 projects, building 2,233 kilometres of railways, 3,530 kilometres of roads, as well as 132 schools and hospitals (Mail & Guardian Africa, 28 January 2015).

China’s unparalleled growth (until recent) and surpluses of investible funds enabled the country to fill a vacuum in infrastructural investment in Africa (Park, 2012; French, 2014). Most of China’s infrastructural finance for Africa lies in four main sectors: power (hydropower), transport (railroads), telecommunications (equipment supply) and water projects. In 2015 China invested 5 billion USD in African agricul-
ture. As noted, it is Africa's biggest trading partner—for example, buying over one-third of Africa's exported oil (Mail & Guardian Africa, 28 January 2015).

Nevertheless, various constituencies – political leaders, civil society actors, the business sector, workers, and the general populace – have mixed feelings about Chinese investment. China’s record regarding workers’ welfare is poor; skills are not transferred to locals, and there is limited impact on local job creation (French, 2014). Another complaint relates to infiltration into the local retail markets, which turns Chinese migrants from investors to competitive vendors, driving local traders out of business and making them to potential emigrants.

Indeed, an EU official (ECDPM, 2010) vigorously debunked the claim that China's investment and aid to Africa surpasses that of the EU, providing evidence that EU-Africa trade in 2009, for instance, was €209.2 billion compared with China-Africa's €62.5 billion. Although China’s investment in infrastructural development is visible to the local population, the EU’s development cooperation in Africa is chiefly in the form of grants, with very few loans. The EU’s multifaceted partnership with Africa covers a broad and varied range of thematic areas: peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade, regional integration and infrastructure, the triple theme of migration, mobility and employment, and so on (ECDPM, 2010).

**Intra-regional migration**

Migration in Africa is principally intra-regional, with South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya being major poles of attraction for migrants. In West Africa, especially, most movements by far take place between neighbouring countries. It is estimated that only 10 percent of West African migration occurs between more distant countries of the sub-region, and only 10 percent towards out-of-area African countries and beyond (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD, 2006).

*West Africa* is well known as a sub-region of intensive migration, refugees and population displacements. Indeed, it is believed that more than half of all migrants in sub-Saharan Africa are in West Africa (Awumbila et al, 2014). The drivers of migration – extremely low incomes, unfavourable socio-economic conditions, landlessness, ecological factors, unbearable population densities and poverty – have been
compounded by population displacements by drought and famine in the Sahel, conflicts, war and political oppression, the scourge of the Ebola epidemic, and terrorism (Adepoju et al., 2015; Kebbeh, 2013).

The 2014 outbreak of the Ebola viral disease affected several West African countries, especially Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Nigeria (Watson et al., 2007). Its effect on population migration was negative, with travel bans, and closures of some airports, land borders and sea ports. The drop in foreign investment and tourism activity resulted in vast economic consequences in the affected areas (UNDP, 2015).

The stock of international migrants within the sub-region is estimated at about 9 million, or 2.8 per cent of the total population. The main countries of immigration – Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – are also countries of emigration and transit. In 2010, Côte d’Ivoire hosted 2.4 million migrants, followed by Ghana (1.9 million), Nigeria (1.1 million or 0.7 per cent of the population) and Burkina Faso (1 million). In relative terms, however, with 16.6 per cent of the population being migrants, Gambia is the country with the greatest immigration, followed by Côte d’Ivoire (11.2 per cent), Ghana (7.6 per cent) and Burkina Faso (6.4 per cent) (UNDESA, 2013; Kebbeh, 2013).

As regards emigration, Mali ranks first numerically (about 1.6 million), followed by Burkina Faso (1.3 million), and Nigeria (about 1 million). However, in relative terms, the Cape Verde ranks far and away first (at nearly 46 per cent), followed by Mali (15 per cent), and Burkina Faso (11.5 per cent). Immigrants from the ECOWAS represent more than 75 per cent of the total stock of immigrants present in all West African countries, except for Ghana (59 per cent) and Cape Verde (10 per cent). For most West African countries, emigrants residing within the rest of Africa represent more than 70 per cent of total emigrants. This dynamic may soon change however, as Mali, Niger and perhaps Burkina Faso become petroleum producers, and thus may start to attract more immigrants.

The leaders of West Africa recognised in the early 1970s that intra-regional integration could be an important step towards the sub-region’s collective integration into the global economy. The formation of ECOWAS in 1975 and the Free Movement of Persons Protocol in 1979 ushered in an era in which the free movement of ECOWAS citizens within member countries was possible. The rights of entry, residence and establishment were scheduled to be progressively established within fifteen years
from the date of entry into force of the Protocol – in other words, by 1994. The implementation of the first phase, over the first five years, abolished the requirements for visas and entry permits within the ECOWAS region. Community citizens in possession of valid travel documents and an international health certificate could then enter Member States without a visa for a period of up to ninety days (Adepoju, 2007a) The delayed second phase of the Protocol (Right of Residence) came into force in July 1986, when it was ratified by all Member States, but up till now (2016) the Right of Establishment has not been fully implemented. In spite of that, people in Community member countries have taken advantage of the existing protocols to move visa-free – mostly from poorer to better-endowed countries within the region (Adepoju et al., 2007; Adepoju, 2015a).

Several major achievements can be credited to ECOWAS, including the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration adopted in 2008, adherence to the principle of ninety-days-entry without visa, and the free movement of persons, as well as the creation of a borderless sub-region (Adepoju, 2009b). These developments have also yielded progress in the introduction of ECOWAS Brown Card travel certificates5, an ECOWAS common passport and, recently, the ECOWAS National Biometric Identity Card (Adepoju, 2015a). In addition there is now an ECOWAS Migrant Response Centre in Agadez, Niger, and a regional observatory for migration statistics is being created.

North Africa is a region with overlapping trans-continental and intra-regional migration systems. Migration within, to and from North Africa consists of mixed migration flows and the distinctions between irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are blurred. Sharing borders with the European Union and the Gulf countries, North Africa is a region of origin as well as being a transit region for labour migrants and asylum seekers to Europe. In recent years, the ‘Arab Spring’ and civil wars in Syria and Libya have contributed immensely to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean (Fargues, 2015; de Haas, 2014; Awad et al., 2015).

The ‘Arab Spring’, which began in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, was a wave of demonstrations, protests and riots whereby regime change was demanded. Ultimately, this uprising led to civil wars that changed the Arab world (Natter, 2015). Despotic long-term rulers were forced from power: first in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, followed by the violent death of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi (sourcewatch.org). Civil uprisings also erupted in Bahrain and Syria; major protests broke out in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait and Morocco. A perhaps unforeseen result of all these uprisings was massive population displacements, and, in the case of Libya, massive return and repatriation of over a million migrants – creating a huge humanitarian catastrophe.

Before the protests erupted, there were about 1.8 million migrant workers in Libya. As the crisis intensified, over 790,000 migrant workers – nearly half of the country’s migrant workforce – and their families crossed the Libyan border into other countries to escape the ravaging violence. (This figure excludes Libyans criss-crossing back and forth to Libya.) The migrant workers – from Egypt, Tunisia, Chad and Niger, as well as transiting ‘third-country nationals’ – are estimated to have represented over 120 nationalities. By the time Gaddafi’s regime collapsed in 2011, however, most of the over 240,000 Libyans who had crossed to Egypt, and the 620,000 who had fled to Tunisia, had returned (IOM, 2012).

Among the 212,000 sub-Saharan migrant workers who returned by direct border crossing into Chad and Niger or were evacuated by the IOM, there were armed fighters who had infiltrated the returnee group. For many decades, Libya had hosted hundreds of Tuareg rebels who were fighting the regimes in Mali and Niger, and conducted their cross-border operations from Libya. The return of armed fighters, including those hitherto incorporated into Libya’s regular forces, with links to insurgency networks, raised political tension leading to a coup in Mali in 2012, and security challenges in Niger and Chad. Some infiltrated into Nigeria (Adepoju et al., 2015; IOM, 2012).

Emigration from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt is directed to different destinations: Moroccans and Tunisians to Europe, Egyptians to the Gulf countries. In both Morocco and Tunisia, emigration serves as an employment strategy, and also increases foreign exchange earnings, promotes domestic investment, mitigates income inequality and increases domestic employment rates (De Haas, 2014; Awad et al., 2015). Indeed, in 2000, Morocco created a National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills in order to organise migration between Morocco and European partners, tackle irregular migration, and regulate the movement of persons between Morocco and the EU. A quota system with Spain has enabled Morocco to send seasonal workers there since 2006.

The civil war in Syria which has uprooted more than 4.3 million external refugees and 6.6 million internally displaced persons (Gower et al., 2016) has also crea-
A new diaspora spread over North Africa, principally in Egypt (with more than 136,000), and with more than 15,000 refugees located in four countries of the AMU - Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Many sub-Saharan migrants fleeing from conflict and economic crises use North Africa as transit zone en route to Europe. The unemployment situation in North Africa has been worsened by the civil wars in Syria and Libya and by the economic backlash of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, and has rendered human trafficking and migrant smuggling a very lucrative enterprise in North Africa (Awad et al., 2015).

In East Africa, voluntary and forced migration configurations include labour emigration and immigration, refugees and asylum seekers, and irregular migration typified by human trafficking and migrant smuggling. East Africa has witnessed massive refugee flows, especially from the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Great Lakes region. The key drivers of migration are diverse, including bad governance, mismanaged economies, conflict, as well as environmental degradation and climate change (Oucho, 2015).

The dominant intra-REC (Regional Economic Community) migration is reflected in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, where the majority of immigrants originates and circulates within the sub-region. There are nevertheless also immigrants from India, China and the USA in (for example) Uganda (IOM, 2013). In Tanzania, Chinese immigrants now engage in small trading enterprises – in competition with local traders. In Kenya emigration takes place largely in response to the country’s poor economic performance, the volatile political climate and poor remuneration. Nevertheless, Kenya has also attracted immigrants from conflict-ridden neighbouring countries, as well as other immigrants, searching for employment, investment opportunities and education (Oucho et al., 2013; Oucho, 2015).

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling is rampant within and through East Africa. Burundi and Rwanda are countries of origin for irregular migrants to the more stable EAC neighbours and, through them, beyond the region. The causes of organised crime and human trafficking include the prospect of better living conditions elsewhere, ongoing political and economic instability, uneven regulatory frameworks, poor international cooperation, as well as a general lack of awareness of applicable laws on human trafficking on the part of both law enforcement agents and the general population (Oucho, 2015). The majority of smuggled persons (10 million out of 14.5
million) are confined to the region, and include victims of crime, poverty and conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (UNODC, 2009).

In Southern Africa, migration pattern used to be structured by state policies in Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa, and by labour demand in the mining and agricultural industries in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. In more recent years, employment opportunities in industrial development in South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia attracted immigrants (Anich et al, 2014). It is estimated that there are about 4 million migrants in the region, excluding irregular migrants in South Africa (IOM, 2015).

Several factors have impacted migration in Southern Africa: in particular the end of apartheid in South Africa and the consequent changes in the mining sector migrant labour system (Crush et al., 2005), as well as conflict and instability in Mozambique, the DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe. Poverty, inequality, and unemployment are key drivers, pushing migrants to South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia – especially from Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, with the last of these countries accounting for the largest number of international migrants in the sub-region (Amit et al., 2015).

Estimates of emigration from Zimbabwe are imprecise, and range from 5 per cent to 25 per cent of the original population at varying baselines (Sachikonye, 2011) – an estimated 1 to 1.5 million Zimbabweans live in South Africa. Emigration from Zimbabwe has been driven by high unemployment, poverty, socioeconomic instability, and a declining education system, and to a degree by political factors.

Mozambique’s rapid economic growth has attracted immigrants from Portugal and Brazil, but also from China. Migrant Chinese workers engage mainly in construction, coal mining, and infrastructure development (Park, 2012). From Mozambique, short-term migrants have taken advantage of the removal of visa restrictions to regularly enter South Africa. Zambia also experiences immigration from the SADC countries Angola, Zimbabwe and the DRC, as well as skilled emigration.

In South Africa, less than one person in ten is a foreigner, and the proportion of foreign-born in the employed population is similar, except perhaps in agriculture,
mining and the hospitality sectors, all of which register a higher proportion of foreign workers than average (Crush & Williams, 2010). The decline in foreign workers in the mining industry has been compensated for by migrants working on commercial farms, and an increased migration by women, especially from Lesotho.

With respect to skilled emigrants, almost a third of SADC-born physicians are resident outside of their country of birth (Crush & Williams, 2010). In South Africa, 20 per cent of trained physicians have emigrated, mostly to developed countries: the UK, Portugal, the USA, Canada and Australia. As long ago as the year 2000, one in ten nurses in the SADC, mostly from Mauritius, Zimbabwe and South Africa, were working outside of their country of birth.

Within Africa, generally, clandestine migrants, who initially enter a country as businessmen, students, or tourists, employ a variety of tactics to stay on at the destination, probably living with friends and working in the 'underground' sector. The deteriorating social conditions in many African countries have reinforced the resolve of emigrants to side-track official channels of immigration to countries of the North. This has given rise to irregular migration through various channels and routes, including trafficking in migrants by organised syndicates. Female migration as a family survival strategy has also intensified. At the same time, what was once regarded as brain drain from the region is gradually being transformed into brain circulation within the region (Lassailly-Jacob et al, 2006), and ‘commercial migration’ of self-employed persons and business-people is replacing labour migration in some parts of the region (Smith, 2014). This is discussed in more detail below.

Outside Africa, there is anecdotal evidence of commercial migration by women traders, especially from West Africa, to China, South Korea and Thailand. Chinese entrepreneurs are combing Africa for energy supplies and are investing in construction, using their nationals in the now-familiar ‘turnpike’ migration models (Park, 2012). The situation is further complicated by the flooding of Africa’s markets with cheap Chinese goods (French, 2014; Cisse, 2013). These trends have not yet been as well documented in the literature as they should be.

Overall, in 2013, 31.3 million Africans were living in countries other than the country where their birth place was located. More than half of these people, some 18.6 mil-
lion people all told, are still living in Africa. The median age of migrants in Africa is the lowest of migrant populations worldwide (30 years); Africa hosts the highest proportion of young persons (aged 15-24 years) among all international migrants (30 per cent). About two thirds (65 per cent) of sub-Saharan African migrants remain in the region. This average conceals striking diversity among the sub-regions: 80 per cent in West Africa, 60 per cent in Southern Africa and 52 per cent in East Africa. In Central Africa, less than a quarter (23 per cent) of migrants resides within the sub-region. The lowest sub-regional share, 6 per cent, of migrants in North Africa reside within that sub-region, with most migrants located in Europe and the Middle East (JLMP, 2015).

Drivers of emigration

The concept of emigration dynamics embraces forces that trigger emigration and its consequences, especially for countries of origin. Quite apart from the effects of excruciating poverty, distorted income distribution, unemployment, ethno-religious conflicts and environmental degradation, new dynamics have in recent years fuelled and constrained migration, and accelerated internal displacements and refugee flows. These include the Boko Haram insurgency, initially confined to Nigeria but rapidly extending to neighbouring countries, other local conflicts, and the devastation caused by the rampant Ebola epidemic. The effects of these have been compounded by population displacements caused by natural disasters, in particular the drought and famine in the Sahel® and the protracted insurgency in Somalia and neighbouring countries, Kenya in particular.

The traditional pattern of migration within Africa – male-dominated, long-term and autonomous – has become significantly more feminised, as professional women migrate independently within and across national borders (UNDESA, 2013; OECD-UNDESA, 2013). This increase in autonomous female migration is not confined by national borders: professional women now engage in international migration in search of employment within and outside the region (Santi, 2015; Dungumaro, 2013). The professions represented include teachers, medical and paramedical staff, nurses and healthcare providers – the countries of origin include Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. There is also a no-
ticeable trend away from straightforward labour migration towards independent commercial migration – of entrepreneurs who are self-employed, especially in the informal sector.

As economic instability has deepened, fewer migrants are able to find stable and remunerative work in traditional regional destinations, and migration remains a key strategy for families trying to cope with economic downturn. Whether migrants stay within their own country, migrate outside their country but within Africa, or leave for another continent altogether, depends on both regional opportunities and foreign constraints (Adepoju, 2009a). As a result of new needs and perceptions, traditional seasonal and circulatory patterns of movement are being replaced by more diverse patterns involving complicated itineraries and multiple destinations. This diversification is evident in rising levels of both temporary and long-term circulation.

The migration of skilled Africans has precedents in the 1960s, when their countries engaged in a significant expansion of access to education. As already mentioned, brain drain is gradually being supplemented by brain circulation – skilled professionals, pressured by uncertain economic conditions at home, have found opportunities within the region to be convenient alternatives to their equivalents in Europe, the United States and the Gulf. Their work in tertiary institutions, medical establishments, and the private sector in these countries has in other words created a form of brain circulation (Adepoju, 2003; 2007b).

Trafficking in children within and across countries, and trafficking in women and young persons for sexual exploitation, mainly outside the region, are significant challenges to human rights and also to development in the region (ECOWAS Commission, 2015). Trafficked children are also recruited through networks of agents to work as domestic servants, in informal sectors, or on plantations (Adepoju et al., 2015). Parents are often forced by poverty and ignorance to enlist their children, hoping to benefit from their wages to sustain the family's deteriorating economic situation.

Migrants are adopting more sophisticated, daring, and evasive methods to elude increasingly tightened border controls and enter countries in the developed North. As is now well-known because of the tragic drowning of thousands in the Mediterranean (de Bruycker et al., 2013), a growing number of young people are
involved in reckless ventures to gain entry into Europe. Three migratory routes – through the western, central and eastern Mediterranean – are the most popular paths used by asylum seekers and migrants. Movements are more clandestine, sometimes involving riskier passages and trafficking via diverse transit points.

In recent times there has also been an emergent trend of displacements as a result of increased incidence of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, and human rights violations. The outbreak of conflict in Mali’s north in 2012 and 2013 sent people fleeing in the thousands into neighbouring countries – Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo and Guinea (Muiderman, 2016). Nigeria is currently engulfed in fighting the Boko Haram insurgency group, forcing people to flee their homes for safety in other parts of the country or in neighbouring countries. These displaced persons have been rendered not only homeless but also jobless.

The demographic scene in Africa is one of sustained high fertility and a rapidly growing population and labour force. The youthful population and the momentum for a doubling of population every quarter century or less will ensure sustained population growth for the next half century. Demographic, economic and political situations in the region thus signal the possibility of further increased migration in the years ahead. This is to be expected, since unemployment, underemployment, inequality and poverty have often worsened or remained high. Indeed, rapidly growing populations, chronic unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, internal disorder, mismanaged economies, drought and desertification mean that many African countries today find it difficult to feed, educate, and protect their teeming populations, and to provide adequate shelter and functional health facilities – the basic needs for a decent livelihood.

African countries recorded significant gross domestic product in the last decade, in spite of the weaker global economy, thereby reversing the decline of the 80s and 90s. However, the lack of inclusive growth means that many Africans still remain poor. In some of these countries, living conditions are much worse now than they were at independence in the 1960s and early 1970s. Poor economic performance in the last decades has been due in part to a series of droughts, initially confined to Sahelian countries – Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Gambia – which have adversely affected agricultural production and exacerbated soil deterioration, at a time of unfavourable terms of trade against predominantly agricultural export production.
The Sahelian countries are mostly landlocked, very poor and are inhabited mainly by nomads, semi-nomads and sedentary farmers. Among the nomads, the most numerous pastoralists are the Fulani, who live in Niger, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal. The poor economic situation, coupled with rapid population growth, weak infrastructure, desertification, declining agricultural productivity and crushing foreign debt, signals a crisis which has now translated into substantial emigration (Adepoju et al., 2015).

The perennial threat of drought has prompted many Sahelians to migrate from highland drought-prone areas to the wetter coastal lands. However, these countries (traditional African receiving countries) are reeling from economic recession. Political conflict is an additional reason for why these countries have been unable to absorb the same numbers of migrants as they were able to do in the past.

The Tuareg, a nomadic pastoralist group, migrate throughout the western Sahel, crisscrossing several countries, particularly Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Niger, and Mali. They have over the decades struggled for autonomy, nationality, and free cross-border migration. For the Tuareg, poverty, drought, migration and conflicts are intertwined problems, since they have no country of their own. For them, continuous, constant, unrestricted movement for trade and agricultural purposes has always been a primary means of survival (Adeyemi & Musa, 2014; Muiderman, 2016).

Over time, many other Sahelians have chosen the option of migration as a means of coping with the effects of environmental changes, particularly those of a sudden and disastrous nature. Usually, affected people seek out environments that can support their survival. They desire an existence likely to be more stable than that which they had before disaster struck. While the occurrence of disastrous environmental events is a significant – and increasingly important – cause of environmentally induced migration, more often migration occurs as a result of less dramatic, gradual deterioration of environments.

International migration is also a coping strategy to find work and expand the choice of destinations for migrants – especially within Africa. During periods of drought, migrants resident in Europe and other diaspora countries send money to household members back home, to cover medical and related expenses, as well as for clothing and general household costs. Those still within the region, especially in Côte d’Ivoire
and Gabon, also send remittances in kind – in the form of food items – to sustain the livelihood of their drought-affected family members (Adepoju, 2007b; 2014a).

Insecurity is a driver of emigration and population displacements. Political instability in Africa has been fuelled by a potent cocktail of corruption, poverty, economic crisis, crime, violence, unemployment and perceived or real failures in governance. Security challenges have been complicated by insurgent attacks such as the one that surfaced in Mali in the early 1990s and gathered momentum in 2007, exacerbated by an influx of arms from the 2011 Libyan civil war. Tuareg nationalists, alongside Islamist groups with links to al-Qaeda, seized control of the northern Mali in 2012 after a military coup (Adeyemi, 2015). The fighting in the north and the establishment of a harsh form of Islamic law has forced thousands to flee their homes: some estimates say more than half the northern population has fled south or across borders into neighbouring countries.

The activity of Boko Haram, a Nigerian militant Islamist group that seeks to impose Sharia Law – initially in and around Maiduguri in north-eastern Nigeria – gained momentum from 2009 (Nwanze, 2014), making world-wide headlines with the abduction of nearly three hundred girls in 2014. Before the intervention of armed forces from the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, more than 13,000 people had been killed and over a million made homeless by Boko Haram violence.

From Nigeria, the violence of Boko Haram has gradually spread to some neighbouring countries, and the security challenge posed to the entire sub-region by insurgent groups has seriously threatened and compromised mobility, while also creating internal displacements of over two million persons, and a refugee crisis of unimaginable proportions. The Boko Haram insurgency is still hampering interstate movements and promoting nefarious activities such as kidnapings and the smuggling of small firearms. The purported links between Boko Haram, Al-Qaida, Al Shabaab and IS have complicated the security threat, and heightened tensions in Nigeria and in African countries such as Kenya, Somalia, Libya, Egypt and Mali, and so on. The attacks on luxury tourist hotels by Al-Qaida-linked Islamist terrorists in Tunisia, Somalia, Mali, Burkina Faso and lately Côte d’Ivoire were intended to create tension and fear, as well as to paralyse the tourist industry.
Population, urbanisation and labour migration dynamics

Sustained past high fertility (the demographic momentum) has ensured the rapid increase in the number of persons of working age in Africa. With a population growing at about 2.8 per cent annually, Africa would require about 7.5 million new jobs right now merely to stabilise the employment situation. Unemployment across the continent ranges from 18 to 50 per cent, mostly among youths – and increasingly among graduates – ready to do any work, anywhere and at any wage. These are the pools of potential, destitute and desperate migrants, whose numbers are set to double within twenty-five years (UNFPA, 2011).

The dramatic increase in the population of the major cities – Lagos, Cairo, Dakar, Accra, Lusaka, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Johannesburg – produces urban poverty as well as squalid environmental and health conditions, to the extent that the contemporary urban scene in Africa has been labelled ‘urbanisation without development’ (UNECA, 2014). The situation has become a breeding ground for migration scams and bogus human smugglers.

The population of Africa is young and is increasing rapidly. Access to gainful employment remains the main concern of youths. Unemployment rates among young people hover around 40 to 60 per cent. Coupled with large numbers of annual entrants into the labour force, the number of underemployed youth and the ‘working poor’ also reflects a mismatch between educational systems and the skills needed in the labour market (Dalberg Global Development Advisors, 2015, World Bank, 2007). The spread of crime, violence, drug and substance abuse is a reflection of a lack of adequate job opportunities for youth who join the masses of job seekers roaming the streets, seeking unsuccessfully for months even for low-paid jobs.

For most, migration in pursuit of higher education or wage employment is urban-centred and perhaps preparatory to migrating abroad. By migrating, youths exchange misery without hope for misery with hope. The weak private sector and the incapacity of the informal sector to absorb the rapidly growing pool of job seekers compel potential migrants to alternative destinations. These destinations are at a remove from what could be captioned as ‘oversized metropolitan areas with undersized job opportunities’, or (better still) ‘exploding cities in unexploding econo-
mies’ (Rosser, 1972; UNECA, 2014). Unable to secure work, even in such cities’ informal sectors, most youths (mainly young men) now join the lengthening queue of those ready to migrate clandestinely to do any job, anywhere – increasingly outside their own country. This seems to have been the trend since the 1990s, when African countries experienced negative economic growth, and when the well-being of the people deteriorated significantly. Such migration has been strictly for survival.

Youths in general face challenges such as inadequate education and skills, lack of employment opportunities, gender discrimination and civil unrest. This is despite a general recognition that young people are Africa’s most valuable asset in the realisation of tangible development. Youth-centred programmes have therefore been initiated in many African countries. These include functional education, training and capacity-building, and employment and enterprise development. Programmes that involve youth in leadership training, health management, environmental conservation and recreation have been initiated in some countries, for example in Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2001).

Root causes of migratory flows and the search for sustainable solutions

Among the major factors prompting emigration are the huge disparities in earning potential between poor and rich countries. These differences reflect the need in origin countries for better employment opportunities, as well as training and skills development. The disparities of course also reflect higher incomes in more favourable socio-economic environments for the destination countries. In recent times, migration has been fuelled globally by access to information, faster and often cheaper modes of travel, demographic dynamics, labour demand and supply dynamics, and the high economic return for labour in high-income countries (IOM, 2013). In many African countries, emigration is rooted in the disequilibrium among the 3Ds – Development, Demography and Democracy (see Adepoju, 2014b).

The cases of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, all in the Horn of Africa, aptly illustrate the root causes of the current African migration outburst, and the challenges of the search for sustainable solutions (RMMS, 2014).
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world—indeed, hardly even existing as a state as of 1991. Conflict-ridden for the past two decades, it is the third-largest country in terms of refugee numbers—after Afghanistan and Syria (Reitano et al., 2014), with over a million displaced to other parts of Africa. With the lack of an effective central government, extreme poverty is compounded by prolonged insecurity, natural disasters, insurgency attacks and human right violations, as well as political instability. Emigrants from Somalia utilise three main routes of egress—southward to Kenya and ultimately often to South Africa, eastward to Yemen, or northward and westward to Libya and thence often onwards to Europe.

In Ethiopia, a series of interrelated factors—climate change, soil degradation, sporadic droughts, and unsustainable population density on limited arable land—are compounded by political oppression and insecurity as triggers of migration (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016). Although Ethiopia recorded remarkable economic growth rate over the past half-decade, the growth has not been translated into job growth for the predominantly young population (AfDB, 2015b). Poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities and perceptions of a bleak future turn many youths to explore migration as a dominant survival strategy.

Eritrea is a third problematic example—a very poor country, ruled by a dictatorial regime accused of widespread and gross human rights violations (Campbell, 2015). The prolonged thirty-year war of independence from Ethiopia, the 1998–2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict, poverty and lack of freedom are key drivers of emigration from Eritrea (GSDRC, 2016). The open-ended compulsory low-paid national service for both men and women (DIS, 2014) means that families are deprived of incomes from potential breadwinners. Alleged arbitrary detention, use of torture, large-scale albeit primitive surveillance, and use of informants coupled with the policy of ‘shoot to kill’ (of evaders, deserters and illegal emigrants) on the country’s borders has ensured that freedom of movement in and out of Eritrea has been extremely restricted (Brhane, 2016; Campbell, 2015). Nationals under the age of fifty are rarely given exit permission to travel abroad, forcing many presumptive migrants to use the services of smugglers. Most Eritreans use the Central Mediterranean route—via Lampedusa and Sicily—to reach southern Europe. Initially, many Eritreans migrated with the intention of residing and working in Libya, but the deteriorating security conditions in that country, manifested in arbitrary detention and arrests, have prompted many to instead head to southern Europe (RMMS, 2014).
The key underlying causes of migration in the endemic countries – Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Mali, in particular, but also Libya and Nigeria – are rooted in oppressive regimes, mismanaged economies, corruption, insecurity, deteriorating livelihoods, and the abuse of human rights. The case of Libya in Africa stands out. A former migration hub for migrants from within and outside Africa, Libya is today a collapsed state and a breeding ground for trafficking in persons to Europe. There, migrants and refugees are caught between a deadly civil war and the rising threat of IS – the Islamic State insurgency (Brantner & Toaldo, 2015). These are the fundamental issues that need to be addressed sustainably, in the creation of good governance, human-centred development with job creation, and human security. Without these attained goals, efforts to contain emigration in irregular situations will be doomed to fail. Indeed, as Brhane (2016) noted in the case of Eritrea – and this may well be the case for other countries of emigration – as long as the reasons for migration are left unaddressed and decent livelihoods remain unattainable in origin countries, or closer to home, "desperate migrants will continue to risk treacherous crossings on unworthy boats" to Europe (Brhane, 2016).

Migration and development: Remittance flows and other diaspora resources

One of the positive aspects of migration is remittances, with impacts in the home country on development at micro and macro levels – such as investments in family businesses. Remittances are a valuable source of foreign exchange; they promote employment and income poverty reduction. In recent years there have been much larger flows of transfers (or remittances) from migrants in host economies to source countries (Ratha et al., 2015). There is, too, a significant increase in the role played by those in the diaspora in the development of their countries of origin, by promoting flows of trade, capital, technology and transnational transactions (Plaza & Ratha, 2011). As already stated, remittances to many African countries now surpass ODA. Indeed the migrant-diaspora-return continuum and its linkages are both strong and pervasive in Africa (Adepoju, 2016).
Diaspora resources include economic remittances, other contributions such as social capital (useful ideas, positive behaviours, and productive identities), technological capital (transfer of knowledge and skills) and political remittances (political support, identities and practices). In general, migration is a factor of economic development that can have both positive and negative consequences. Advantages at source areas include migrants’ remittances, lower unemployment, diminished population pressure and knowledge brought home by returning migrants. Immigrants in general can embody energy, determination and enterprise, and can dynamise economies, social organisation and interchange of experience. A major challenge is how to make migration work productively for regular situations and channelling movements into such situations, so as to benefit the three key participant actor categories – migrants, origin and destination countries, as well as societies and families.

In addition to direct financial contributions, migration leads to the formation of transnational communities, which boosts economic development. Migrant communities abroad, as well as returning migrants, become conduits for new ideas and investment. Migrants themselves form associations and networks abroad. Returning migrants bring back skills and work experiences from abroad. Emigrants can also transfer knowledge, technology and investments to their countries of origin (Adepoju, 2014a). African governments should tap into the opportunities offered by the UN General Assembly’s proclamation of 2015–2024 as the International Decade for People of African Descent. This proclamation aims to promote national, regional and international cooperation in relation to full enjoyment of economic, social and political rights and full participation in all aspects of society for African populations, and national governments stand to gain from participating in this agenda.

Remittances to migrants’ source countries in Africa have been rising steeply and now parallel export earnings as well as ODAs. In the case of Lesotho, remittances account for fully one-half of the Gross National Product (GNP) (Crush et al, 2010). Remittances are an important source of income for many African countries. Also nationals of countries like Egypt, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Eritrea remit huge sums of money to their home countries while working abroad (Basu & Bang, 2015).
Table 2. Estimates and projections for remittance flows to Sub-Saharan African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USD billions</th>
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<td>2018f</td>
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Note: f = forecasts  
Source: World Bank, 2015c

Table 2 presents the inflow of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa. The sheer volume of remittances to sub-Sahara Africa – over 30 billion USD in 2015 – has kindled optimism about their positive contribution, and the role of the diaspora in development in their home countries (Ratha et al., 2015). Remittances are expected to be additional sources of development financing in Africa by providing a lifeline not only to communities and families of migrants, but also to entire countries of origin. Communities and families may use remittances to gain access to basic services such as housing, education and health. Countries of origin benefit from remittances more generally, insofar as these augment national savings and investment via money and capital markets. However, the real impact of remittances on the economies of emigration countries in Africa is yet to be fully understood. Apart from raising national savings, remittances are nonetheless essentially private transfers that do not directly augment the public budget. Governments also have no control over them, and do not determine their destination or their use. Nor are market forces able to channel remittances to the most productive sectors or into the most innovative entrepreneurial hands to promote development (Ratha et al., 2010).

In other words, the use of remittances varies widely. Remittances may constitute a lifeline to poor relations left behind, in paying for basic services to them such as
health care in particular. Remittances may also pay for the education of siblings and/or children left behind, offset the costs of setting up enterprises, and enhance agricultural production – for example, through improved irrigation schemes and other agricultural inputs. There is evidence of such use of remittances in Mali and Senegal, for example (Orozco et al., 2010). In Lesotho, and Tanzania, for example, remittances constitute a survival lifeline for many impoverished rural households (Dungumaro, 2013). More generally, migration in Africa can be seen as a household portfolio diversification strategy – pooling resources helps the poor overcome the poverty constraint to migration. In addition to such benefits, remittances can also (as mentioned) stimulate entrepreneurial family members to set up enterprises, with a multiplier effect on local economies. Hometown associations’ investments can also draw upon remittances to improve basic infrastructural facilities that benefit all households – with local, and often even broader, multiplier effects.

In poor communities that lack the basic services normally provided by government, the pressing needs are for better housing, funds to pay for school fees, textbooks and uniforms, and access to basic health services – which migrants’ remittances supplement or pay for. Many migrants harbour the ambition to ultimately return home — upon doing so, they may invest in petty trading, in refurbished or new buildings, or in high-yielding real estate, with augmented savings as a fallback position.

Another pertinent issue here is, however, the lack of reliability of remittances. Many families in Africa who depend on remittances from relatives in the United States or Europe for day-to-day support are being affected by the global economic meltdown, as well as by crisis-induced retrenchment and unemployment in migration destination countries (Adepoju, 2009a). This takes a heavy toll on the daily budget of recipients through the reduced levels of remittances.

Not all remittances are routed via official channels, on account of heavy transaction costs and the chance of loss or fraud. The transaction costs of money transfers are often exorbitant, and sending money ‘home’ through informal channels may be risky. Irregular migrants who are vulnerable, exploitable and subject to uncertainty and insecurity, normally opt for informal channels of remittances, for fear of even apprehension and deportation in extreme cases (Basu & Bang, 2015). Senegalese emigrants, on the other hand, have adapted the indigenous, trust-based traditional human courier system (Kara International Exchange) – using the existing network of traders, or visiting relations and associates, to send money home. This process is
prompt, avoids exchange rate fluctuations and costly transfer charges, and overcomes the bottleneck of limited formal sector access to remote rural areas.

African governments are increasingly interested in promoting migrants’ remittances for investment purposes, and are using their embassies to disseminate information on available investment opportunities to their nationals abroad (Ratha et al, 2011). For example Ghana offers a favourable incentive-based policy environment (regarding taxation and related instruments) (AfD B, 2015a). Also Kenya’s government has expressed its readiness to explore the option of matching funds, or of providing security for bank loans for nationals in the diaspora willing to invest at home. The possibility of diaspora bonds has also been flagged for in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria.

In the same vein, granting amnesty for irregular migrants in Europe would remove them from the underground economy, as Spain did in 2004 in consultation with employers and workers’ unions – thereby boosting official remittance transfers to families left behind. The fear of apprehension and deportation forces irregular migrants to refrain from using official channels such as banks and money transfer agencies, and means that they instead patronise riskier outlets.

Luxembourg has a project to promote savings of migrants in Mali, Senegal and microfinance in Cape Verde (EMN, 2015a). "Money from Sweden" is a transparent World Bank-certified government-funded free online service, which provides comparisons of fees and exchange rates for transfers abroad through various alternative agencies. The service, run by the Swedish Consumer Agency, is quoted as the fastest possible deal and is independent of all market players (see http://www-moneyfromsweden-se-en). This initiative follows Germany’s enhanced remittance price comparison between different money transfer institutions through "a restructured and re-launched website" (www.geldtransfair.de). Other EU countries can follow these examples, based on lessons learnt from the Spanish amnesty programme and the recently introduced online Swedish remittance service.
Education, employment and management of population growth

Globally, the number of working poor at the income level of about 2 USD per day declined between 2001 and 2006. In Africa, however, the number of poor by this definition increased by 14 million over the same period, while the number of workers earning no more than 2 USD per day reached a record high of 26 million in Africa. It is precisely this growing decent work deficit that prompts youths – desperately seeking a more secure alternative future – to engage in the dangerous and uncertain journey to developed countries (AUC, 2012).

Africa is saddled with a growing, poorly educated youthful population. Over 50 per cent of the continent’s population is projected to be living in urban areas by 2100, and the capital cities are already home to the majority of the urban population. Big cities are increasingly the big drawcards in creating jobs, or as the places where migrants hope to secure jobs.

One major manifestation of rapid population growth is the high, often increasing, youth unemployment rate of up to 60 per cent. Most unemployed youths reside in the cities, often the capital, and some barely eke out a living in the informal sector of the economy, largely as underemployed working poor. They constitute the pool of potential emigrants in mostly irregular situations.

Young people are a vulnerable group in the labour market, being twice as likely to be unemployed as the adult population. Those who find work in the informal sector face poor conditions, long working hours, job insecurity, hazardous work environments and low wages. Underemployment and/or unsatisfactory employment are therefore also triggers of migration for the working poor.

Underlying demographic trends will become one of the most important types of determinants for the migration agenda, as millions of Africans are added annually to the pool of unemployed or marginally employed persons (UNFPA, 2014). A major development issue during the next decade will be creating productive employment for the millions of educated youths who will scramble for work in the formal sector, or join the lengthening queue of potential emigrants. These migrants want only to make a better living; their families want them to send home remittances. According
to the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM, 2005), in some countries (for example in Ghana) up to 90 per cent of young people report that they would emigrate if they had the opportunity. A decade on, the situation is probably the same.

The unemployed youth constitute a dormant labour force – a waste of human resources – on whose education parents and society have expended scarce financial resources. They remain socially and economically dependent, and are often disillusioned. Employers are also worried by the fact that many graduates are inadequately educated and are not employable except in low-grade jobs. In tertiary institutions, there is a lack of incentives, and working environments and conditions are unfavourable: libraries are archaic and laboratories have outdated equipment. A few decades ago, a young graduate would probably have secured a job a few months after graduating from the university, and would have begun a process of assisting younger siblings to acquire a formal education. Today, young graduates roam the streets, seeking for months for a job – without success. Even if they are successful, the salary is usually too meagre to support a minimum level of living, especially if the workers have dependent families (Adepoju & van der Wiel, 2010).

The demographic-economic challenges facing the region find their expression in problems encountered particularly by youth – inadequate educational opportunities, unemployment and underemployment, deprivation, poverty, economic uncertainty in the cities, and rural degradation. These problems will worsen as expectations and aspirations remain unfulfilled. One visible manifestation of problematic trends is precisely the influx of migrants into the cities, which is compounded by irregular migration across national borders, especially to developed countries, in search of viable educational and employment opportunities.

Africa has the highest figure for the fraction of population defined as working poor, prompting the emigration of youths. For these young men and women, creating more productive jobs and decent work locally holds the promise of arresting the irregular migration of an increasing number of persons surreptitiously seeking entry to Europe (AUC, 2015).

The vast majority of Africa’s youth released into the labour force lack the skills to enhance their prospects of employability. All over the region, the bleak job market situation, which is also a result of economic slowdown, will push many youths into
PART 1 – Observations and analysis

trying to leave the continent. The spectre of irregular migrants risking their lives to enter southern Italy forcibly, in overcrowded rickety boats, or across the desert (tragically witnessed in 2014 and 2015, not least) is likely to intensify – in large part because of the huge employment deficit in Africa, in the face of burgeoning numbers of young school leavers. Many of these youths will be more desperate, hoping to exchange the misery of a bleak life at home without hope for a future, however uncertain, in Europe (Adepoju, 2016).

Côte d’Ivoire, a magnet for migrants in West Africa, is just recovering, albeit sluggishly, from years of instability. It is now a country of immigration, transit and emigration – as is Nigeria, regarded as having the largest (service-sector based) economy in Africa (Adepoju et al., 2015). South Africa’s mines have been shedding thousands of mine workers, and many unprofitable mines have been closed in response to the global commodity price slump and economic slowdown (Shabalala, 2016). This story is essentially replicated in Zambia, where the fall in copper prices has led to thousands of lost jobs. In Gabon, lower oil prices have adversely affected tax revenue and negatively impacted employment, with one in every five Gabonese persons and one in three of all young Gabonese now being out of a job (World Bank, 2015b). In all these countries, unemployment is a major development challenge and a trigger for emigration.

The youth constitute a viable resource, but less than half of the African school-age population is enrolled in schools, and several thousands drop out each year in each country. The deterioration in the quality and quantity of educational inputs – with outdated equipment, poorly trained and disillusioned teachers, and shortages of textbooks and supplies – has already been mentioned. Less than 2 per cent of each cohort that starts the primary level is able to complete a university programme. In many countries, significantly fewer girls than boys attend school and complete the courses.

Here is the critical challenge which Jeffrey Sachs (2015) tagged in a speech to the European Forum for New Ideas (EFNI):

...a slower moving crisis which for Europe is absolutely real, and that is the African migration crisis...But the problem is that [Africa] is not addressing some of the core challenges fast enough, and demography is one of them. [Africa’s population has] grown more than five times since
the middle of the last century… and is projected to be four billion people in 2100. Talk about a migration crisis. That’s completely unmanageable. It’s unmanageable for Africa’s development; it’s unmanageable for Europe.

…I would urge Europe to…[help Africa] make the breakthrough to ending extreme poverty and to the demographic transition to low fertility rates and stable population later this century. And the most important thing that Europe can do is to help ensure that every girl and boy in Africa gets a decent education in the coming generation, because this will be the single most transformative step that Europe can make for Africa’s breakthrough and for Europe’s own, long-term stability.

Without proper education and job opportunities, Africans will continue to migrate in the hope of work elsewhere.

Challenges to productive migration

The transformation of brain drain to brain circulation within Africa is slowly taking root. At the same time, commercial migration is replacing labour migration – rapidly formalising informal sectors (in South Africa, for instance), and generating domestic employment. Policies should creatively promote this type of development.

The many unemployed young people, who fall as easy prey to trafficking scams, need to be productively engaged. Policymakers are also confronting the challenge of enhancing the economic, political, and social environments of their respective countries in order to retain and lure home the skilled professionals required for national development.

The underlying long-term polarising demographic dynamics have left the world with an ageing population in the rich countries of the North and a booming youthful population in most countries of the South, especially in Africa. In the OECD especially, the debate on immigration policy within EU countries highlights the ageing of the population and in the economy, with a total EU population that has been growing only modestly in recent years. As short-term population measures, EU countries may resort to importing workers from the global South to make up for the drastic
shortfall of workers for two types of jobs: the poorly paid, dirty, and dangerous low-end jobs which their nationals often scorn, and the highly specialised professional jobs for which qualified personnel often are in short supply (software and information specialists, engineers, doctors and nurses).

Statistics tell us that African immigrants in EU countries have, on average, higher educational attainment than the local population, and the same is true for African emigrants to the USA. This may reflect the selective policy process that gives preference to educated migrants for the Green Card and allied schemes (Adepoju, 2009a; 2015b). All these circumstances call for a transparent strategy to support serious global migration concerns in Africa, the continent that has to struggle most with poverty and migration.

As economic and political processes evolve, the major challenge is how to make migration work productively – for migrants, and, in origin and destination countries, for societies and families. Policy dialogue on migration is at a crossroads – not least because the diverse actors and stakeholders in African and EU countries, as well as a variety of interest groups, have genuine (albeit often conflicting) interests in making migration work better. In both blocs of countries, economic and demographic factors strengthen the import of current debate and policy on the migration of skilled and unskilled persons.

The weakness of overall governance of migration issues in most African countries is due in part to the multiplicity of national institutions involved and the poor coordination amongst them, which is also reflected in the capacity deficit of officials dealing with the migration and development nexus. National migration management capacities are also hampered by poor systems of data management, and a lack of capacity on the part of national institutions involved in migration management to organise, collect, process and disseminate statistical data on their activities. These shortcomings are aggravated also by institutional capacity challenges linked to insufficiencies in financial, human and technological resources.

We need to underline here the global nature of our increasing interdependence, our shared responsibility, and the future of the numerous generations yet unborn, as Africa and its people enter into a new era of possibilities and challenges. The world has come to a crossroads economically, politically and demographically. In respect
of this last-mentioned issue complex, three important factors are shaping global population trends and patterns: growing populations, poverty, and policy measures aimed at addressing these challenges. Part 2 addresses these policy issues.

Effects of the global economic downturn

Global financial and economic turmoil has introduced yet another dimension to migration dilemmas: the world’s worst economic crisis since the end of the Second World War. Its impact has spread beyond the coasts of the rich countries when the crisis began to affect emerging market economies, and poorer economies as well. The speed and depth of the world economic crisis’ diffusion makes the poor countries of Africa very vulnerable. Even the emerging and fast-growing economies of Brazil, China and India, once very buoyant (Van Agtmael, 2007), are now facing difficulties. The impact of the recession in South Africa is being felt acutely by the labour-sending countries of the SADC, whose economies are very largely dependent on that of South Africa. Migrant-sending, poor countries, whose economies depend heavily on migrants’ remittances, are the ones set to suffer most from the global financial and economic crisis (Ghosh, 2013).

Unlike rich countries, no African country is able to launch robust stimulus plans, inaction which exposes already poor African people to further hardship. For many aid-dependent countries – Uganda, Rwanda, Malawi, Senegal, and others – the flow of development aid is set to decline, just as are private capital flows. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that most private foundations are spending less on aid than previously, and that development agencies are downsizing their staff and projects.

Migrant-receiving countries are closing their doors, and local populations are increasingly xenophobic as job competition increases between migrants and nationals, with government ministers enforcing the implementation of strategies to ensure that the few existing jobs are reserved strictly for nationals, genuine fears earlier raised by Stiglitz (2006). Without opportunities for regular entry, more migrants are likely to try irregular channels, often through dangerous scams organised by unscrupulous human traffickers.
In Africa, many countries that received substantial numbers of migrants are no longer capable of absorbing more, and are now expelling irregular immigrants (Adepoju, 2016). The xenophobic reactions to immigrants in many parts of Europe, especially in the wake of the current migration crisis, have reinforced the feeling that immigrants from African countries who work in the hospitality and domestic care industries are unwanted and must be returned to their countries.

The economic slump is battering migrants from Africa. For tens of millions of people working outside their homelands, life is becoming much more precarious. Many industries where migrants predominate (such as tourism in Ireland, construction in Spain and North America, and even financial services in Britain) have been among the first industries to shed jobs. More recent arrivals in Europe are distressed by the tightened global labour market and the increasing difficulty of finding even menial work. With unemployment running high – in most cases, the highest levels in fifteen years – prospects for immigration are dim. The recent refugee crisis has exacerbated the problem.

The predicted impact of the slump in rich, migrant-receiving countries is three-fold: some potential migrants may be discouraged altogether from making the move, some may have to return voluntarily (or be forced to take that decision), while yet others may opt for migration instead to emerging economies such as China, Brazil or South Africa, some of which are also undergoing challenges as a result of global economic slowdown (Adepoju, 2015b). With the ILO projecting a global loss of about twenty million jobs over the next decade, migration is bound to slow down (ILO, 2009). However, anticipated returns, even in response to incentives by countries such as Spain for migrants to return to their countries of origin, have not materialised.

The world financial crisis has thus added a new dimension to the migration debate. Migrants are often reluctant to go home during an economic recession; it is not only the host countries that have to cope with an economic downturn, since the migrants’ home countries often face the same or a contemporaneous crisis, with what are sometimes even more severe attendant problems. During periods of economic meltdown, anti-immigration sentiments grow – as can currently be seen in Europe – and governments step up enforcement efforts to repatriate foreign workers. These efforts are seldom successful, and migrants simply disappear into the underground economy.
The 2015 migration crisis: The European response

The year 2015 arguably saw the biggest influx of migrants and asylum seekers into worldwide migration routes since the Second World War. By the end of that year, the numbers of migrants smuggled to Greece and Italy, together with asylum claims lodged in Germany, passed a million – an increase from just over 200,000 in 2014 (Fargues, 2015). As is well known, there has been a major change in source countries, to conflict-ridden regions both near to and relatively far away from EU borders. Syria and Libya stand out as origin countries relatively proximate to Western Europe, while Iraq and the Horn of Africa stand out as relatively distant new origin countries or regions. This migratory upswing has been accompanied by shifts in prevalent migratory routes – from the precarious central Mediterranean (Libya to Greece or Italy) to the eastern Mediterranean, a route which is shorter and less risky. The later route was used mostly by Syrian refugees, while Africans have mostly used the most treacherous central Mediterranean route (EMN, 2015b).

The migrants are mixed in terms of their countries of origin and their status – migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. A list of the nationalities of asylum seekers via the eastern Mediterranean was initially headed by Afghans, but this has shifted to Syrians. Among African origin countries, Eritrea has taken over leading origin country status from Nigeria. Besides, the persistent instability in Libya rendered the country a source and a channel of irregular migratory flows to Italy via the central Mediterranean route.

The busiest time for migrants attempting to enter Europe, and the period when most fatalities occur, is constituted by the summer months. The perilous journey to Europe by sea is only part of the equation. Many emigrants perish during the course of travel over the tortuous land routes, undertaken over several days, months or even years. The 3,500 deaths recorded in 2015 are to be added to an unknown number of missing persons, including the bodies of 48 migrants found decaying in the desert between Niger and Algeria in mid-June, 2015 (Swing, 2016).

In 2015, April was the worst month, when a boat carrying about eight hundred migrants capsised in the sea off Libya. As the world watched in unbelieving dismay, the tragedy of capsised migrant-carrying ships caused an observer playing with human statistics to write:
2015 has been the year of the migrant crisis, but traversing the Mediterranean on a rickety boat isn’t actually as perilous as media reports have made it appear – statistically, at least. Last year, for example, at least 3,500 asylum seekers and migrants died while crossing the Mediterranean Sea to southern Europe. But 219,000 people successfully made the crossing. That translates to a ‘journey success rate’ of 98.4 per cent (Mail & Guardian Africa, 2 January 2016).

The media in Europe was awash with news headlines on the tragedy, but the bulk of the asylum seekers came from outside Africa, principally from Syria and Afghanistan – with about 222,000 Syrian asylum applications in the first nine months of 2015, followed by Afghani (103,000) and Iraqi (69,000) applications (European Commission, 2015).

The symbolic milestone was passed on 21 December, with the total for land and sea arrivals reaching more than 1,006,000 entries via Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, Malta and Cyprus (BBCNews, 2015b). The crossing of more than a million migrants and refugees into Europe in 2015 sparked a crisis, as countries struggled to cope with the influx, and created a division in the EU over how best to deal with resettling people. On 10 November 2015, Reuters, quoting FRONTEX (Reuters, 2015) raised the stakes by warning that "There were some 1.2 million irregular entries to the European Union in the first 10 months of this year, four times more than in the whole of 2014" (http://af.reuters.com/article/-commodities-News-/idAFB-5N0Z-O00S20151110).

Greece and Italy have served largely as transit countries for most refugees; asylum seekers arriving at Europe’s Mediterranean shores have preferred to ultimately head for Germany or for Sweden, where they hoped to receive generous benefits, secure jobs and shelter. The majority of the asylum seekers in Sweden – Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans, Iraqis and Somalis – are those most likely to be granted protection (EMN, 2015b). The decades-old Swedish reputation for hospitality is being put to the test, however, with pressure on services posed especially by the growing number of unaccompanied minors. In 2015, Sweden and Germany received 50 per cent of all asylum applications in the EU from children travelling alone, with Sweden accepting between 29 and 40 thousand unaccompanied minors that year, and Germany about 30,000 (Rietig, 2015; Tanner, 2016). There was speculation in the media that ‘Sweden[']s] far-right party makes gains from [the] migrant crisis’ (Adler, 2015a).
The call for burden-sharing and joint responsibility by EU members is becoming amplified. Sweden received about 160,000 asylum applications in 2015, second only to Germany in absolute numbers (Tanner, 2016). As depicted in Figure 1, close to 1,670 refugees per 100,000 persons in the domestic population in Sweden applied for asylum in 2015 – just behind Hungary, with 1,800 applications per 100,000 domestic residents. Germany, with the most asylum applications, had 587 applicants per 100,000 domestic residents in this time period (with perhaps a higher figure later in the year).

**Figure 1. Asylum Applications per 100,000 domestic population, EEA, 2015**

Note: EEA: European Economic Area.

Source: BBC 2015a, quoting Eurostat, Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe (Figure as at 28 January 2016).
The disproportionate burden caused by spontaneous and sustained arrivals of refugees and migrants by boat and land to Greece, Italy and Hungary heightened tensions, forcing the EU ministers in September to set up a plan to relocate 120,000 refugees EU-wide, with 66,000 from Italy and Greece to be resettled immediately.

The backlash was immediate: Germany, facing intense pressure at home, especially from anti-immigration political parties, and from EU neighbours for accepting up to a million asylum-seekers, ultimately warned that it could send Syrian refugees back to other EU states. The anti-immigration party AfD was quick to criticise the open-door refugee policy. This probably prompted Hungary to insist that it would not receive so much as a single refugee, while Slovenia began emulating Hungary in putting up border fences. Denmark also said it was tightening immigration rules, and in Sweden the Minister of Migration warned that at current rejection rates for asylum seekers, it was to be expected that about 80,000 asylum seekers would be rejected in one year (Croush, 2016). In all of these cases, vocal groups within the domestic population were becoming increasingly concerned about the impact of the large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers on social services.

**Endnotes PART 1**

1. The author wishes to thank Ms Biddy Greene for editorial assistance on an initial draft; Ms Edefe Ojomo for helpful research assistance and Prof. Ibrahim Awad for useful observation on the migration-development nexus.

2. The ECOWAS countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

3. The SADC countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

4. The OECD is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and its member states are largely countries of the “Global North”.
5. The ECOWAS Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme was designed to provide a common, minimum insurance coverage for vehicles travelling between participating member states. A standardised ECOWAS Travel Certificate was also adopted to make cross-border movement easier and cheaper. These certificates are valid for two years, and are renewable for a further two years.

6. The "Horn of Africa" countries are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

7. The countries of the "Great Lakes region" are generally considered to be Burundi, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, north-western Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

8. The Sahel is the semi-arid region stretching across Africa between the Sahara Desert to the north and the savannah grassland to the south. It encompasses parts of northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, the extreme south of Algeria, Niger, the extreme north of Nigeria and South Sudan, central Chad, central and southern Sudan, and northern Eritrea.
PART 2 – Practical needs and resulting policy measures

The drivers of migration and how to address them

Over the past year or two, migration has climbed to the top of the political, social and economic agenda across Europe, with a focus on migrants from the war-torn Middle East. As already stated, what is currently often missed is, however, the corresponding increase in migration out of Africa and the even greater increase in migration within Africa itself. The tendency is thus for such policy and research that does deal with Africa to focus on migration from Africa to Europe, despite the fact that most African migration in fact occurs within Africa itself.

Most of the drivers of migratory flows and the proposed solutions are global in nature and cannot – indeed should not – be addressed solely at a regional level. For Africa, policy responses in the medium and longer term are yet to be crystallised at national, sub-regional and continental levels. A start has been made, but more needs to be done to move from rhetoric to action.

Lack of up-to-date comprehensive data on migration poses a major challenge however. Data on international migration in Africa remains fragmentary and incomplete, meaning that a multiplicity of sources will have to be explored in order to deal with the problems inherent in assessing the major types of migration. In doing so, data collection procedures will need to be standardised to ensure comparability within and between the sub-regions of Africa as viable tools for policy formulation and assessment.
Dimensions of migration within and from Africa: Some areas for reform

In examining regional emigration dynamics, it is pertinent to critically examine interactions between the demographic, economic, ecological, political and socio-cultural dimensions, since migration is and has been a predominant response to the cumulative destabilisation of social, economic and environmental systems.

Population growth

As described above, Jeffrey Sachs advocates massive investment in education programmes in Africa to enable youth to bring down the fertility rate – a near-absolute precondition for development efforts to succeed. In most African countries, therefore, population management should be a complementary (indeed, an essential) component of any sustainable development agenda. What long-term population development programmes are both strategic and sustainable?

Figure 2 graphically depicts the projected trend in population in Africa and the world. With a population of about 1.2 billion in 2015, Africa's population is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050 under a medium fertility assumption, and possibly 4.4 billion in 2100, representing 39 percent of world's population, up from 16 percent in 2015. More than half of global population growth in the period 2015-2050 is expected to occur in Africa (UN, 2015). Will Africa be able to feed and provide shelter, jobs and sustainable livelihoods for these people? The projection should galvanise policy makers to vigorously design and implement long-term programmes to ensure that population trends are realistically in tune with development potential. Herein lies the need for concerted efforts to embark on population management programmes so as to match current and expected development resources.
Figure 2. UN medium variant projection of world and Africa population (billion)

Source: UN, 2015

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<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2100</td>
<td>39.1</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: UN, 2015

The momentum for rapid population growth is evident in the youthful African population, where most people are currently at (most usually) both reproductive and productive ages. This demographic situation poses both challenges and opportu-
nities. For Africa to reap the benefits of a bulging youth population - the so-called demographic dividend -, planners have to concurrently invest in education, health, infrastructure and productivity of the labour force (ILO, 2015). This implies that population policies and employment policies have to be implemented in concert to ensure productive employment for young persons. Gainful employment by educated persons can help achieve fertility reduction, and impact directly both on the population’s growth rate and its total size. In the long term, such programmes also bear indirectly on migration dynamics.

**Trafficking**

The region’s human trafficking and smuggling map is complicated, involving diverse origins within and outside the region. Recent findings stress the imperative to focus on the economic, socio-cultural and political context within which trafficking of the most vulnerable groups – children and women – takes place. Within and outside the region, this trafficking mainly takes the form of sexual exploitation. However, as mentioned above, trafficking victims are also often sent through networks of agents to work in some kind of servant capacity. The lack of appropriate anti-trafficking legislation – and the weak enforcement of what laws there are – must be addressed by strengthening laws and applying policy frameworks to apprehend, prosecute and punish traffickers and to protect their victims (Oucho, 2015; Adepoju & van der Wiel, 2010).

**Loss of skills to the diaspora**

To counter the loss of skilled nationals into the diaspora, African leaders need to put in place policies that are designed to ensure that conditions at home are sufficiently attractive to retain such skills. For example, industrial establishments need to operate at optimum capacity, providing an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive. Promoting democratic governance and popular participation is also important. Both kinds of measures can ensure that returning nationals can be more effectively inserted into domestic economies.
Local employment

A major development issue during the next decade will be creating productive employment for the millions of educated youths who will scramble for work in the formal sector or join the lengthening queue of potential emigrants. These problems call for responsible and clear-sighted leadership by governments and international partners. A reversal of all-too-prevalent negative trends requires revitalising the structure and management of all levels of the education system in most or all African countries. Education system restructuring would entail designing curricula to suit the changing needs of labour markets, while also combining formal education with work-based training to upgrade the limited skills of youths and also to encourage entrepreneurship. It also implies ensuring that training abroad through scholarships offered by EU countries under the Valletta Plan is tailored to the skills requirements of domestic economies.

Rural-urban divide

Development strategy in African countries has been biased in favour of urban areas, a situation which is both a cause and consequence of migration, and the root of the problems of the burgeoning cities. The major African cities are overwhelmed by migration from impoverished rural and peri-urban areas, of mostly unemployed youths living in squalid conditions in squatter settlements. These cities in general lack the facilities and resources, human and material, to cope with their rapidly expanding populations. In essence, management problems within the cities, as well as their causes and attendant necessary policy countermeasures, all stretch beyond city limits.

Remittances

All stakeholders should work in concert at exploring the opportunities and minimising the obstacles for sending remittances, and particularly in lobbying for low-cost transfer services and less stringent regulations, in order to increase the volume and productive use of this capital. This is in consonance with the Valletta Action Plan to promote cheaper, safer, legally compliant and faster transfers of remittances,
as well as to facilitate productive domestic investments and to promote diaspora engagement in home countries.

Studies have been conducted on how high transaction fees are as a percentage of a benchmark amount of internationally transferred funds — the benchmark or base amount is 200 USD in the study we will now cite. The global average cost of sending 200 USD internationally has decreased from 11.6 per cent of the base amount in 2014 to 7.7 per cent in the second quarter of 2015. However, some things have not changed — sub-Saharan Africa is still the most costly region in the world to which to send remittances (Ratha et al, 2015). Reducing the average remittance cost markup to less than 3 per cent of the base amount remitted, as well as promoting financial inclusion and literacy, are among the most important outcomes of the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. The Sustainable Development Goals agreed upon in New York at the end of 2015 also include recommendations for a reduction in the cost markups of remittance transfers. These recommendations should be implemented forthwith.

**Mixed migration flows and shifting migratory routes: Policy challenges for Europe**

The current crisis in human displacement across the Mediterranean has blurred the distinctions between migration and refugee movements, as well as between source, transit and destination countries. The spectre of the crisis featured thousands of refugees from the Middle East mixed with migrants from West and North Africa and even from South Asia.

In such circumstances, one obvious first action to take was to investigate the immediate personal causes of the displacement of migrants and refugees, as a firm basis on which to formulate policy. Policies aimed at addressing migration should however also be concerned with refugees and asylum seekers. First, on the part of Europe, the much-touted opening of regular migration channels should be put into practice (Collett et al., 2016). Europe needs to recognise its demand for migrant labour, including the labour demand in the informal economies of Mediterranean countries. Migration opportunities consonant with this demand should reduce at-
tempts at irregular migration, and thus reinforce safety as well as cut unnecessary loss of lives. However, meeting the demand for labour in Europe by employing migrant workers from Africa should not take place at the expense of the functioning of labour markets and development in Africa. It is imperative to develop additional skills locally to counter the brain (and muscle) drain that would be the consequence of a more expansive approach. Funding should, then, go to the regions from which migrants originate, with a view to creating productive employment opportunities there. This would, at the same time, contribute to the development of these regions. Addressing the causes of migration – which should be at the core of migration policies – would thus be closely linked to development efforts. The ‘migration and development’ slogan would thus become reality. The trust fund created by the Valletta Summit could well contribute to funding both migration and employment opportunities.

It is also to be emphasised that the upsurge of disorderly migration flows from Africa and other regions of the developing world reveals problems with the functioning of the global economy. Rules that hamper emancipation from underdevelopment and poverty – and which indeed may even be reinforcing these causes – have to be changed. These include unfair trade regimes, agriculture tariff and barriers, and often unethical recruitment of highly skilled professionals from poor countries (see Ghosh, 2000). It is not possible to keep producing underdevelopment and poverty and to force people to coexist with these threats indefinitely.

The European Agenda on Migration

The so-called European Agenda on Migration was presented by the European Commission in May 2015 and states the need for a comprehensive approach to migration (European Commission, 2015). Due to unprecedented pressure on the EU Member States’ asylum systems, the Agenda proposed, among other measures, a temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection to ensure participation of all Member States in the reception of people in need of protection.

Concern has however been expressed over the slow progress on response to pledges made by EU member states – for instance, on sharing the number of asylum
seekers more equitably, or regarding plans to send relief materials to stranded migrants, or providing personnel to patrol Europe’s external borders. The actual relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU countries has posed what is perhaps the greatest challenge, especially given the slow pace of actual implementation (Swing, 2016; Adler, 2015b).

The proclaimed EU response to the humanitarian disaster was first and foremost to save lives. The second priority was anchored on increasing humanitarian aid and development assistance to refugees and migrants. The European Agenda on Migration aims to prevent further loss of lives at sea and to reinforce overall cooperation with the major countries of transit and origin.

The Agenda also aims to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement in countries of origin and transit, in particular by strengthening the rule of law, by creating economic and education opportunities, and by building better governance. Hand in hand with these aims, the Agenda also aims to promote effective and sustainable regimes of return, readmission and reintegration, for irregular migrants not qualifying for admission. To achieve this in Africa requires a firm commitment to supporting capacity-building in migration and border management, as well as to the stabilisation and development of the countries concerned.

To this end, the EU has signed joint declarations with five partner countries in Africa: Cape Verde, Morocco, Tunisia (Mobility Partnerships), Ethiopia and Nigeria (Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility).

**Sustainable burden-sharing between origin, transit and destination countries**

As already stated, rich EU countries need to help poor African countries, especially those that are major origin and transit countries for emigrants. This assistance should aim to foster local development, reduce poverty and create domestic employment in origin countries.

Rich EU countries also have a moral responsibility to assist in programmes for the orderly return and reintegration of migrants to their countries of origin – especially
highly-skilled professionals whose expertise is being productively utilised in rich
destination countries. Any long-term solution should emphasise economic growth
and employment generation, the promotion of human rights, and security and re-
lated policy measures – as well as taking cognisance of the factors that generate
emigration from poor African countries in the first place.

Compensation for brain drain could take the form of supporting projects which
involve professionals going back to their countries of origin for short periods to
work in special programmes and education, an idea which was first advanced over
a decade ago (ILO, 2004). Ethical recruitment of highly-skilled professionals must
be enforced, and bilateral agreements promoted, to minimise the adverse conse-
quences of brain drain on the development of origin countries. Such bilateral and
multilateral agreements between OECD countries (especially those of the EU) and
African countries should also address issues of the haemorrhaging of its scarce
skilled manpower resources. It is important that residence rules in rich countries
be made more flexible, allowing skilled diaspora professionals an opportunity for
virtual relocation without losing their attained additional residence rights. A start
in this direction includes Sweden’s bill on circular migration and development (ef-
fective as of July 2014) to encourage so-called brain circulation. It allows a foreign
citizen with a permanent residence permit to leave Sweden and be able to return, so
long as s/he notifies the Migration Agency of his/her intention to keep the permit.
Sweden also provides support and funding of the health sector in Zimbabwe and
Somalia to enable health workers to return to their countries of origin (EMN, 2015a).
Other EU member states could follow this example.

Any sustainable solution to the current migration crisis must involve improving the
economic situation in the migrants’ countries of origin. Such a strategy also has
the potential to stimulate the return of skilled nationals – needed for development
in their own countries. This calls for cooperation – beyond the rhetoric of co-deve-
lopment – between poor African labour-exporting countries, and rich EU countries.
Unless economic and other opportunities are created in these origin countries,
pressures for international migration will continue to intensify.10

It is speculated that perhaps about three million migrants will have arrived in
Europe by the year 2017, possibly boosting the region’s economic growth in the pro-
cess, but at the same time weakening the migrants’ countries of origin (BBC News,
2015b).
It is against this backdrop that, in April 2015, the EU called for an inter-continental meeting with its counterpart in Africa to discuss migration and economic development issues. The inter-continental meeting on migration, otherwise known as the EU-Africa Valletta Summit, held in November 2015, came up with an Action Plan that identified five key priority areas in migration that require immediate action: (i) migration and development, (ii) legal migration and mobility, (iii) international protection and asylum, (iv) irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, and (v) returns and readmission. The Action Plan also identified fifteen priority projects to be implemented by the end of 2016, using the € 1.8 billion EU Trust Fund set up at the Summit to tackle the economic and security problems that cause people to flee their countries of origin (European Council, Valletta Action Plan, 2015). Policy-related details of the Valletta Summit meeting are discussed at greater length below.

The African Union (AU) on its part held a meeting in the aftermath of the Valletta Summit, to provide a forum for all fifty-four AU Member States and the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs). At the end of the meeting, the AU drafted its own migration plan for the coming year, in line with its programmes and the priority initiatives of the Valletta Action Plan.

While the partners of the Valletta Summit (the AU and EU) remain hopeful of a successful outcome of the implementation of the Valletta Action Plan, the urgently pertinent question is: can the adopted plan take care of the migration problem before the problem leads to further social catastrophe?

The EU Emergency Trust Fund ‘for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’ was established to provide additional funding and contribute to a flexible, speedy and efficient delivery of support to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management. The Fund aims to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development.

The Action Plan sets out several initiatives for cooperation between Africa and Europe on migration issues. For African businesspeople and other travellers from countries that agree to take back citizens whom EU states want to expel as "illegal"
aliens, EU officials highlighted renewed offers to ease the visa application process and other potential access problems for the permitted entrants. Under a pilot scheme, African states will send officials to Europe to help identify those of their citizens whom they would accept back. Many would-be immigrants to Europe sometimes destroy their own documents in an attempt to thwart efforts to expel them, which of course would hamper such policy efforts at identification of possible re-admittees.

The € 1.8 billion for the Emergency Trust Fund financing such ventures will come from the EU budget and the European Development Fund, as well as hoped-for contributions from EU Member States and other donors. The African countries expected to benefit from the fund are those that are situated along major migration routes to Europe, and which are also among the most fragile and most affected by migration. The countries in this category which are to be found in the Sahel region and the Lake Chad area include Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. From the Horn of Africa and adjacent areas, the included countries are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The pertinent north African countries are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, countries that border these target countries may benefit from Trust Fund projects that have a regional dimension, and are designed to address regional migration flows and related cross-border challenges. It is expected that the Fund will foster stability and contribute to better migration management by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, and by promoting economic opportunities, security and development (European Council, Valletta Action Plan, 2015).

Although the Valletta Action Plan on Migration recognises the need to take into consideration country-specific factors, the plan does not more closely address the national root causes of the migration crisis, many of which are deep-rooted. The lack of social amenities and real development are some of these challenges. In countries where there are leadership issues and political instability, people have been forced to migrate from their homes and countries. This observation pertains not least to the dictatorial leadership in Eritrea, a country where emigration will not substantially abate until problems of governance and forced military conscription are resolved. What is required is a political solution, by democratising the political space.11 Also, unless addressed, the failing education system and bulging youth unemployment in a country like Nigeria will continue to cause Nigerians to look for
better opportunities outside their country. The one-year target for major change resulting from the plan is as optimistic as it is unrealistic, in view of the human, infrastructural and governance capacity deficits in Africa.
The Valletta Action Plan and beyond

The EU-Africa Summit in Valletta in November 2015 offered a great opportunity to critically examine the complex migratory landscape and to propose sustainable solutions. The resulting Valletta Action Plan (‘the Plan’) provides a summary of the activities deemed necessary for enhancing migration and development plans in Africa, by strengthening national and regional capacities and building partnerships. In the following section, we undertake an analysis of the opportunities which the Plan offers African countries, as well as of the challenges to be overcome in optimally realising the potentials.

Overall, the Valletta Summit and its Action Plan seek to protect refugees and/or migrants, tackle people-smuggling, and foster better migration management, while sending home irregular migrants and at the same time providing Africans with legal channels of migration to Europe. These legal channels would include awarding scholarships and increasing the number of visas available to students and researchers.

The EU has committed to assisting African countries, regional institutions and civil society organisations to build their capacity in addressing these key issues – while taking into consideration the predominance of national sovereignties, legislation and contextual specificities.

Many of the intervention activities under the Plan involve strengthening the material capacity of African states to address migration-related development challenges and develop their economic capabilities for promoting peace, security and development in their territories and regions. However, in order for the target countries to properly administer the material support systems envisioned in the Plan, they must have in place an appropriate legal and policy framework for implementing such support measures. Additionally, their officials must have the capacity to effectively implement the policies and administer the relevant material frameworks provided under the Plan.

The areas covered under the Plan address social, political and economic issues such as community engagement, peace and security, good governance, human rights protection, and financial management and regulation. The Plan covers a wide
range of actors such as public officials in national and regional institutions, civil society actors, private financial institutions and international partners.

It is crucial to underline several issues that arise from the context and content of the Plan, from the perspective of the prevailing African situation.

Addressing the governance deficit

The main source of expected funding for the Plan appears to be the EU and its Member States. The Plan aims to provide support to national and regional institutions, but, in the long run, such support can be sustained only by domestic efforts in the target countries, including local matching funding. The Plan covers substantial issues such as good governance, economic development, human rights recognition and protection – all of these issue domains should ordinarily be possible for the relevant target countries’ governments to oversee and control. However, the Plan’s own logic illuminates a significant governance deficit in these respects for the African countries to which assistance will be provided.

In addressing this deficit, the Plan must deliberately operate within a governance framework which will build the capacity of states to supply public goods for their citizens and short-circuit triggers for emigration. The issues raised in the Plan relating to peace and security, economic development, youth engagement, and climate change are matters that are at the forefront of governance issues in Africa. The Plan thus identifies migration and mobility as an important issue cluster that affects (and is affected by) core governance issues.

While major governance issues such as democratic representation, financial management, and security exist within the domestic territory of states, migration very clearly reveals the interdependence of states in the midst of fragility – particularly the interdependence between governance in Africa and migration both inside and outside the continent. The interdependence question therefore reveals how state fragility in Africa can affect (and has affected) also states outside the continent, thus inviting intervention. However, the focus of the Plan in action should be placed on the main underlying governance deficits, rather than simply on the migration and mobility factors that are the consequences of the deficit.
In order to address the governance deficits, efforts must focus on sustainability. Long-term sustainability must lie at the core of implementation in order to ensure that the implementation of projects based on the Plan does not disintegrate when first-order intervention efforts end.

**Sustaining efforts and building capacity**

Sustainability would require three important focal points: framework, funding, and capacity. The Plan focuses on these three areas by supporting the development and modernisation of legal and policy frameworks relating to economic, social, and political issues that touch on migration and mobility. By assisting countries to develop such frameworks, the Plan provides a basic foundation for governance and development strategies aimed at strengthening states in performing their function of protecting their citizens and their territories. The framework will have to be updated from time to time in order to ensure its applicability to changing trends and contextual issues.

Funding is a major concern for many African countries, especially since the continent has suffered continuous economic decline in the past decades, resulting from violent conflicts, poor governance, and economic mismanagement. The funding provided under the Plan is therefore important for helping these countries address some of the most demanding governance challenges – challenges that they would otherwise likely neglect, due to the absence of a reliable broader policy framework and the necessary capacity to leverage available funds and frameworks. However, available funding must be judiciously used, to build the capacity of states to raise their own revenue so as to provide good governance, maintain infrastructure and enhance development in their territories and regions.

In order for the Plan to lead to governance solutions that will address the underlying causes of the migration and mobility challenges of African countries, the capacity of public officials and civil society must be strengthened so as to implement the framework and manage the funding required. Capacity building is perhaps the most important aspect of the programme, since this would ensure that the framework and funding provided under the Plan do not go to waste. Capacity building will involve the strengthening of human and infrastructural capacity, as well as strength-
ning partnerships and relationships between national and regional stakeholders.

Supporting regional efforts in Africa

The state is the main governance mechanism in Africa – as in other parts of the world – but the rise of regional governance mechanisms has meant that some of the functions and responsibilities of states have been transferred upwards to the regional level, where groups of states combine their resources to supply public goods. In Africa, regional institutions are particularly important as mechanisms for combining resources to meet many of the governance challenges that states face. By providing such a system of cooperation, these regional governance mechanisms can provide further support for extending the framework, funding and capacity amongst themselves, while also providing the legitimacy required to contextualise the solutions. Thus, the external intervention introduced under the Plan can be ‘internalised’, through the development of regional governance mechanisms which can support states despite their fragility, both through deepened capacity and legitimacy.

Regional governance mechanisms ensure that African states can address the sovereignty concerns that they have within the context of their individual and collective fragilities, thus addressing the underlying governance concerns that also involve migration and mobility issues.

The need for research, advocacy and consensus-building

For African countries to benefit optimally from the 2015 Valletta Action Plan, I have identified a series of research, advocacy and technical assistance activities that would be required in each of the five intervention areas listed below. These activities could be undertaken collaboratively by national experts with proven skills and local knowledge of the issues as follows:

Legal migration and mobility

- Conduct research on current trends in migration across Africa, the
Mediterranean and Europe, including root causes of irregular migration, and provide a comprehensive policy advisory document to guide countries.

- Conduct research on existing national migration strategies in specific African countries with a view to identifying policy gaps (absence of migration policies or gaps in existing policies).

- Conduct research on existing national migration strategies in specific African countries with a view to identifying policy gaps (absence of migration policies or gaps in existing policies).

- Document a comprehensive set of recommendations for enhancing regular migration, as well as for curtailing or eliminating irregular migration.

- Develop a training guide and pilot training programmes for public officials and civil society organisations involved in migration-related areas, including policing, justice administration, and financial policy development.

- Provide technical assistance to states and other stakeholder organisations on identifying and addressing issues regarding migrant rights.

- Conduct research on the effect of past and current migration-facilitating efforts, in order to determine how migration-facilitation plans can be better or optimally implemented.

**Protection and asylum**

- Provide detailed and comprehensive research on both conflict and natural disasters in Africa and their impact on human development – including their effect on external displacement (reflected in numbers of refugees and asylum seekers), as well as on internal displacement.

- Provide policy and advisory support on displacement and human rights, to help African countries and regional organisations develop effective strategies (in collaboration with their partners) so as to protect vulnerable populations.

**Tackling irregular migration**

- Provide training and capacity building for national and regional officials, as
well as civil society actors, on national, regional and global instruments that address irregular migration and organised crime.

- Develop a training guide for the continued training of public officials and other stakeholders, regarding dangers of irregular migration and ways of protecting victims of irregular migration.

- Help to draft pamphlets and legislative templates for introducing and updating relevant legislation on irregular migration and related activities on a regular basis.

**Return, readmission and reintegration**

- Build capacity for public officials and service providers, enabling them to provide adequate response and protection for return migrants.

- Provide advisory support to countries and regional organisations on forming partnerships for the facilitation of return, readmission and reintegration.

**Enhancing the role of regional economic communities**

Functional sub-regional and regional economic organisations could facilitate intra-regional labour mobility, and promote self-reliant development within the region. Recent attempts to formally ratify the memorandum to set up an African Common Market by 2025 should be viewed in this context. Such sub-regional and regional bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation unions are likely to greatly influence the flow of labour migration in Africa. Countries that have hitherto remained ambivalent regarding the principle of free movement of persons, and that also have been reluctant to modify domestic laws and administrative practices, should now realign national laws with sub-regional treaties to facilitate intra-regional labour mobility, establishment and settlement. Lessons learnt from ECOWAS in creating borderless sub-regions should be replicated by other sub-regional organisations.

Although increasingly a global phenomenon, migration in Africa – refugee flows,
displaced population, and labour migration – should be addressed within a regio-
nal framework. Sub-regional cooperation unions are the building blocks for the
African Economic Community. They hold the potential to greatly promote the flow
of labour migration, especially in Communities with agreements that provide for
free flow of skilled labour and rights of establishment in member countries. The
frameworks developed by ECOWAS (through the ECOWAS Common Approach on
Migration) and the African Union (African Common Position on Migration) could be
adapted by other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in managing organised
labour migration inter- and intra-regionally (see ECOWAS, 2008; AUC, 2004; 2006).

The on-going processes of regional economic integration in Africa, through regio-
nal economic communities, are designed in large part to facilitate labour mobi-
licity and economic development. Many such regional communities or community
precursors now exist, including the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African
Community (EAC), and regional dialogues such as the Migration Dialogue for West
Africa (MIDWA) and MIDSA, the Migration Dialogue for South Africa. It is potenti-
ally very fruitful to follow these examples, intensifying African countries’ efforts to
enter into bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements. These agreements have
an important role to play in supporting systematic and effective efforts by regional
and international labour movements to address the supply and demand of labour
markets, promote labour standards and reduce irregular movements.

Support for policy measures by the
African Union

The African Union Commission has shown considerable interest in migration mat-
ters, especially in the past decade – partly in response to the upsurge in, and dire
consequences of, irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling of persons
from Africa to Europe and elsewhere (Adepoju, 2016). Consequently several region-
al and continental policy frameworks and instruments have been established.
These include, importantly, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2004), which
sets out policy guidelines on nine key thematic migration issues to assist member
states and RECs in formulating migration policies. Related migration instruments include the African Common Position on Migration and Development (2006); the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development; the AU Framework on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention); the Joint Africa-EU Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children; the AU Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation; the Social Policy Framework for Africa; and the AU Plan of Action on Boosting Intra-African Trade Initiatives. Others include the promotion of the Labour Market Information System, and the Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa (AUC, 2015).

At the 25th AU Summit in Johannesburg in 2015, AU leaders deliberated extensively on how to manage migration effectively by committing themselves to addressing a comprehensive range of issues by 2018. These include speeding up the implementation of a continent-wide visa-free regime, including the issuance of visas at all ports of entry for all Africans, expediting the African Passport project; improving labour mobility by establishing harmonised mechanisms for ensuring that higher education in Africa is ‘compatible and comparable’ between Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries, to enable the recognition of credentials that would facilitate the transferability of knowledge, skills and expertise; and operationalising existing action plans to combat human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants (AUC, 2015).

The AU has launched several programmes to address various migration-related issues. The major ones include the 2009 AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU.COMMIT) Campaign (2009), with the Ouagadougou Action Plan at the centre of its approach. The campaign reached out to member states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in taking practical measures to combat trafficking in human beings, while encouraging all actors to use the Ouagadougou Action Plan as a reference to develop and reform policies, laws and interventions on trafficking in human beings (especially women and children).

In 2014, the African Union Commission (AUC) established the African Union Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants, in response to the irregular migration flows within and from the Horn of Africa. This initiative aims to enhance cooperation among relevant member states in addressing the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants within and from the Horn of Africa region to the Middle East, Europe and southern Africa. The initiative also creates a
forum for cooperation among member states in the Horn, also in joint efforts with other transit and destination countries.

The African Commission also established the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) in November 2014, to help reduce transaction costs of remittances while encouraging member states and individual migrants to leverage remittances for socioeconomic development of the region.

The 24th Assembly of the AU adopted the Labour Migration Governance for Integration and Development in Africa initiative (also known as the Joint Labour Migration Programme – JLMP). The JLMP builds on conclusions and key recommendations by member states and RECs to facilitate the implementation of relevant policy frameworks on labour migration, as well as the AUC’s transformational ‘Agenda 2063’, which aims to work towards continental integration. The objectives and actions set out in the JLMP are designed to address the challenges of labour migration and mobility in the region by enhancing the capacity of member states and RECs. They include (i) achieving wider elaboration, adoption and implementation of harmonised free movement regimes and coherent national labour migration policy in the RECs, (ii) extending social security to migrants with access to portability regimes, and (iii) resolving skills shortages and skills-education mismatches, while increasing recognition of harmonised qualifications across Africa – to enhance mobility and free movement regimes which will provide alternative legal channels of migration, and reduce irregular migration (AUC, 2015).

Further policy recommendations

The overall issue of migration cannot, and should no longer, be solely handled bilaterally; what is needed is a global approach to a global issue through global harmonisation of migration policies. A pro-active and forward-looking global approach to manage migration is required, and needs to be supported by the various international organisations and governments, and then be implemented locally.

Strengthening Regional Economic Communities

To the extent that migration is, and will continue to be, South-South – in some cases, within regional economic communities – concerted efforts should be made to
revamp such RECs, and also to promote managed inter-REC labour migration through multilateral agreements built on the effective demand and supply of required skills.

Intra-regional trade within Africa remains an abysmally low fraction of total trade. Intra-regional trade should be further encouraged, to take advantage of its potential for stimulating development, poverty alleviation and job creation. The indirect impact on migration can be tremendous. A fair trade regime, in addition to aid, is also required.

**Combating unemployment**

African policymakers face the urgent task of resolving the unemployment crisis. Policy measures must, for example, focus on attracting and expanding foreign direct investment to create jobs, in order to absorb the pool of unemployed – including potential emigrants – and curtail unwanted migration to the EU and other rich countries. Policy measures must also be formulated with the aim of coordinating foreign aid packages with the workings of local employment-generating programmes.

It has long been argued that greater access to European markets through preferential trade agreements could foster economic growth and generate employment in poor African countries, with a potentially direct impact on curtailing intra-regional and inter-regional migration (Ghosh, 2000).

Tight immigration policies, however, breed irregular immigration, so the success of restrictive migration policies depends on improving the economic situation in immigrants’ countries of origin. Such a strategy also has the potential to stimulate the return of skilled nationals needed for development in their home countries.

In most African countries, the institutional capacity required to manage migratory flows and for effective policy formulation and implementation is weak, and must be strengthened through the training and retraining of key officials.

**Creation of an Advisory Board on Migration Management**

In general, demographic and economic processes drive migration dynamics, but these seem to be ignored by the authors of the political processes which generate both migration and population policies. Moreover, there are wide gaps between
what African governments agree to, and what they in fact have the capacity (human and institutional) to implement. Beyond governments as the major stakeholder, civil society organisations, the business community and migrant communities have not been fully engaged in migration matters, in part due to also these actors’ own capacity deficits for dealing with these complex issues. The key consideration is therefore how to bring together all stakeholders or actors – governments, the business community, and civil society at national levels – to engage in a common effort to promote and implement the Valletta Action Plan priority areas within the specified time frame.

There is no formal forum in Africa for specifically discussing migration matters. Hence, a regional African Advisory Board on Migration Management for all stakeholders should be established as a continuous process, in order to avoid the misrepresentations, ignorance and xenophobia that currently surround the issue of migration. Discourses on migration, especially from the receiving end, are full of anxiety, misconceptions, myths and prejudices – and also feed on xenophobia. In that context, the positive aspects of migrants as agents of development in source and destination countries need to be more widely recognized. Policy analyses should elaborate on such positive roles played by migrants, so as to increase the likelihood that the rights of migrant workers in the host countries are protected.

The Advisory Board would broaden the scope and objectives of the national political dialogue on migration and development between EU and African countries, where dialogues between these parties exist. The Advisory Board could also be modelled in accordance with the example of bodies coordinating the Annual National Migration Dialogue in Nigeria, with the support of the Government of Switzerland. The Swedish government’s (or, more broadly, the EU’s) support for the Advisory Board would help kick-start its establishment and activities – perhaps with the technical support of the International Organisation for Migration. However, the resultant policy forum should then be ‘owned’ by the Africans themselves.

**Collect data and conduct research on other ‘push’ factors**

At present, information on stock and flow data regarding migration is in principle obtainable only from destination countries. This situation should be rectified – the
more so since most migratory configurations involve multidirectional cross-border movement. Data on migration is uneven and not comparable across countries, making it inadequate for the compilation of national migration profiles. The collection of up-to-date information on migration across borders will have to be factored into data-gathering procedures. Cooperative cross-border research and information-sharing between the countries and sub-regions of Africa that serve as origin, transit and destination points of migrants should be encouraged to address this challenge.

The incidence of conflicts and epidemics in the region is exerting a contrary impact on cross-border movements. Research on early warning mechanisms regarding conflicts is required at local, national and sub-regional levels – to predict drivers of ethno-religious and related conflicts, so that timely warnings and potential response packages may be put in place.

Very limited information is available on the relationships between migration and environmental change. The exact placement of so-called ‘environmental migrants’ in the voluntary-forced migration continuum is as yet unresolved, especially in the Sahel. This calls for research-based understanding of the relationship between environmental ‘push factors’ and migration, to inform appropriate policy formulation.

Final words

In spite of the sharp economic and demographic divide between Europe and Africa, international migration can become a win-win-win situation for origin countries, destination countries, and for migrants themselves. However, hard work and many contributing factors will of course be necessary to bring this outcome about. Determination, political will, the right policies, and recognition of the potential positive contribution of migration to development are all necessary here. This study has inventoried some of the most important aspects of the migration policy problem cluster in these respects for Africa and for the world. Sharpening our overall understanding of the policy challenges here is only one precondition for more appropriate policy action, but better understanding of the challenges faced is important for overcoming them.
Endnotes PART 2


10. Personal communication with Professor Ibrahim Awad.

11. Personal communication with Oluwabusayomi Sotunde of ruralreporters.com.

12. This section benefits from personal communication by Edefe Ojomo, a doctoral candidate and NOMRA’s resource person.

13. On March 6, 2016, Ghana’s President announced the issuance of visas for all Africans at point of entry into Ghana to mark the country’s Independence Day.
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Catalogue of Delmi’s earlier publications

Radical right parties and attitudes to immigration in Europe, by Mikael Hjerm and Andrea Bohman, report and policy brief 2014:1.


Integration policy and the labour market, by Patrick Joyce. Research overview 2015:3.


The dilemmas of categories, by Per Strömblad and Gunnar Myrberg, Research overview 2015:7.


Migration and history, by Dick Harrison, Research overview 2016:1.


Irregular migration and Europe's border controls, by Ruben Andersson, Report and policy brief 2016:3
More than 31 million Africans have moved to countries other than their birthplace in search of better livelihood and life chances. Emigration in Africa is driven by the often interrelated push factors of poverty, unemployment, unstable politics, ethno-religious conflicts, rapidly growing populations and environmental deterioration. Most of African migration is intra-regional. Migration is both regular and irregular, with the latter including those assisted by smugglers and traffickers to gain entry into Europe. Given this context, it is important to address the question of how the EU and Sweden can assist African countries to find long-term solutions for cross-border mobility.

This Delmi research overview describes and analyses migratory trends in Africa, their root causes and effects, as well as challenges resulting from them. It also discusses different initiatives that have been developed within Africa and by the EU to address migration and its drivers, both in the medium and long term perspective. The study is written by Prof. Aderanti Adepoju, one of Africa’s leading migration scholars. Prof. Adepoju is the coordinator of the Network of Migration Research on Africa, and Chief Executive of the Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos, Nigeria.

The Migration Studies Delegation – Delmi – is an independent committee that initiates studies and supplies research results as a basis for future migration policy decisions and to contribute to public debate.